Striking a Balance:  Whistleblowing Protections in the Intelligence Community by Herrera, Elizabeth Angela
STRIKING A BALANCE:
WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Public Administration
by
Elizabeth Angela Herrera
August 2008
© 2008 Elizabeth Angela Herrera
ABSTRACT
Whistleblowing has become more important and more controversial as many
federal employees take their information directly to the press.  Despite the several
federal statutes offering employees protections from reprisal for whistleblowing within
their agencies, employees continue to take inside knowledge of corruption, scandal,
waste, and mismanagement directly to the public via the media.  Current
whistleblowing laws protect government employees who utilize their agency’s internal
grievance procedure, including informing their Inspector General’s office, Office of
Personnel Management, or other human resource office. The laws typically do not
protect employees who leak information to the press.  Federal employees within the
intelligence community however, were explicitly excluded from most protection
clauses until 1990.  Even after those laws were amended to cover federal employees,
the statutes are still designed to favor the agency.  As an example, federal employees
from the Central Intelligence Agency have one of the most complicated procedures for
correctly blowing the whistle on their agency and/or superiors.  The CIA is required
by law to protect their employees; however, national security provides the agency with
a strong defense that makes these statutes almost meaningless for CIA agents.  Several
CIA agents have been fired or demoted due to their whistleblowing.
To understand the consequences of excluding national security employees
from the whistleblowing protection laws and the consequences of these exclusions, I
will examine the legislative history of federal whistleblowing statutes and determine
why national security agencies were excluded from coverage under these protection
clauses.  I will study the goals of various statutes, as described in Senate and House of
Representative hearings and testimonies in the creation of several bills.  I will focus on
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987 that
was vetoed by Ronald Reagan, the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1999,
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and its 1994 amendments, and the
Notification of Federal Employees of Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2003.
Also currently in Congress is the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007
or H.R. 985 and the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act or S. 274, which
would add intelligence agency employees to protected groups when whistleblowing
information is provided directly to authorized members of Congress or the agency’s
internal office.
1
I will then focus on the CIA and the process and procedures for handling
employees’ claims of wrongdoing within the agency.  Currently whistleblowing
literature focuses on business operations and mainstream government employees such
as scientists, researchers and other professionals.  Very little has been written on
federal law enforcement employees such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA
and others.  In deciding to limit protections of national security employees in the
whistleblowing statutes, it seems likely that Congress engaged in discussion about the
consequences of including those employees in the protections.  I will explore this
question of whether Congress used national security as a rationale that effectively
enables the federal government, particularly the executive branch, to knowingly
participate in wrongdoing.  This would enable individual agencies to engage in wrong
doing without fear of repercussion.  Omitting employees from these agencies would
also protect the executive branch and directors of the agencies from public scrutiny
because national security keeps that information from ever becoming public
knowledge.  Under these rationales, agencies are able to set their own procedures for
whistleblowing internally with little oversight from outsiders.
Finally, I will examine a few examples of whistleblowers in the CIA and the
outcomes of their actions.  Was the information they provided utilized to change the
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organization or was the employee’s life and career affected?   These questions can
help us understand whether national security employees are in great danger of reprisal
and whether their knowledge about wrongdoing is critical to the public.  I will
examine two cases of Central Intelligence employees: one who sought to utilize the
agency’s internal procedures for whistleblowing and another charged with leaking
information outside the agency to the media.  These cases, taken from two very
different points in history, will illustrate the differences in procedures, but similar
outcomes of two CIA whistleblower cases.  Richard Barlow was fired in 1989 for
reporting to his superiors that Pakistan had built a nuclear bomb, and Mary O.
McCarthy was fired in April 2006 after supposed leaks to the media about secret
operations.
Little of the whistleblowing literature and case studies address the ways in
which the public can access whistleblowing complaints and outcomes.  I hope my
research will contribute to the current debate in Congress for an effective
whistleblowing statute to protect intelligence community employees and offer the
public some access to critical information about these powerful agencies.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Enron, WorldCom, September 11, 2001, Aru Ghraib, Central Intelligence
Agency secret detention centers or “blacksites,” the truth about Vioxx and tobacco:
such recent events and headlines in United States history have increased the public’s
knowledge of corporate and government corruption.  But how has the public learned
of such corruption?  The key to providing the public with information about these
events have been insiders known as whistleblowers.  It is very likely that today, most
major newspapers across the nation feature breaking news provided by whistleblowers
about illegal or unethical practices in government and business.  The media also tells
the public of these individuals’ bravery and unselfishness.  In 2002, Time magazine’s
“People of Year” issue featured three whistleblowers.  Colleen Rowley of the FBI,
Sherron Watkins from Enron, and Cynthia Cooper from WorldCom were given the
credit they deserved for unmasking government mismanagement, accounting fraud,
and phony bookkeeping.
1
  With such knowledge and media coverage, public outcry
for government and corporate transparency has increased.  Lawmakers have attempted
to respond with new statutes while more nongovernmental watchdog organizations
have been established.
Employees of any organization may be witness to internal processes and
information showing illegal, wasteful, or abusive actions.  When individual employees
take it upon themselves to report such wrongdoing to internal offices or outside groups
or individuals, they are known as whistleblowers.  Often ethical duties as public
servants and commitment to justice compel employees to speak out.  Whistleblowers
are at risk of reprisal, though, particularly if the organization intends to keep the
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 “The Whistleblowers, Person of the Year,” Time (30 December 2002) from
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20021230,00.html.
2discovered processes or information secret.  Employees in the private and public
sectors receive legal protections from various national and state labor laws when
participating in whistleblowing.
2
  At the federal level of government, employees fall
under the purview of several whistleblower protection laws, many of which are riddled
with loopholes and confusing language.  More specifically, intelligence employees of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and National Security Agency have the fewest protections under these laws,
as the information they witness can be deemed classified by the executive branch.
Their ability to report wrongdoing within their agency is therefore limited by their
involvement in intelligence gathering.  Because of their limited legal protection under
whistleblowing laws, intelligence employees often turn to the media or outside
organizations to report agency wrongdoing.
Not everyone supports whistleblowers.  Agency officials, Congress, U.S.
presidents, inspector generals, and government attorneys have played crucial roles in
expanding or limiting the protection of whistleblowers under the law.  Often seen as
snitches or rats by colleagues or government officials, whistleblowers may lose their
jobs, pensions, friends, and status when speaking out.  The media also participates in
how whistleblowers are viewed by the public.  As with Time magazine, media
coverage can give whistleblowers celebrity status when the information they divulge
reveals millions of dollars of fraud or the potential to save lives.
There are over twenty-five whistleblower protection laws, passed to protect
public employees from reprisal.  Federal employees, however, often lose retaliation
cases in court or before the Merit Systems Protection Board.  Their claims are often
deemed as insufficient, erroneous, or classified by the Office of Special Counselor,
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 For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204, protects private sector employees who
provide evidence of corporate fraud; the Civil Service Reform Act, Pub.L. 94-454, protects federal
employees who file claims of mismanagement, abuse, or illegal activities within the public sector.
3Merit Systems Protection Board, or various agencies’ Inspector Generals.  Federal
employees lose in such great numbers that the media and nongovernment agencies
offer whistleblowing hotlines, which become the preferred anonymous method for
blowing the whistle.
Employees of the intelligence community face a particular challenge in
striking a balance between protecting the government’s interest and protecting the
public.  The dilemma faced by policy-makers lies in the ability to protect all such
federal employees who report misconduct, and simultaneously protect the national
security interests of the United States.  The possibility to meet both these goals,
however, is possible.  A comprehensive, specific statute outlining the procedures and
protections for every federal employee who wishes to provide information about
wrongdoing to specific members of Congress or agency officials could address both
the government and the employees’ needs.
This thesis examines the conflicts and contradictions of several whistleblowing
statutes.  Against this background, the thesis focuses on the implications for allowing
or omitting intelligence employees from the statutes.  This analysis reveals the ways
protecting national security has been used as a rationale to limit the passage of federal
whistleblowing statutes covering intelligence employees.  The thesis studies the
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) as an example of a federal intelligence agency
with few statutory protections for whistleblowers.  As the analysis will show, the
CIA’s process for reporting wrongdoing within the agency requires intelligence
employees to navigate complicated procedures that still leave the employees
vulnerable to retaliation.  The experiences of two employees from the CIA will be
utilized to illustrate these issues surrounding whistleblowing at the national security
level and the reasons employees may feel that the only way to share information is via
the media or to report it after they have left the agency.
4Chapter II provides an overview of the various definitions of whistleblowing
developed by political science and legal scholars.  These definitions encompass
reasons whistleblowers report wrongdoing, what they hope to achieve, and the
outcomes of blowing the whistle.  The scholarship on whistleblowing offers differing
viewpoints of whistleblowing and its effectiveness for inciting change.  Chapter III
analyzes the federal statutes that provide whistleblowing protections, from the Floyd-
LaFollete of 1912 through the end of the 1990s.  This analysis spans a little over 80
years of federal statutory history, which includes federal whistleblowing statutes
affecting intelligence employees.  Chapter IV traces the laws enacted from 2000 to
those currently pending in Congress.  This analysis outlines the current legal
protections for federal whistleblowers.  Further, pending bills in Congress provide a
window into possible protections for intelligence employees.
Chapter V provides a brief analysis of the CIA’s history of secrecy and denial,
including the executive branch’s use of national security as a justification for keeping
secrets from citizens and Congress.  This overview presents the CIA’s history of
engaging in and maintaining secrecy about its covert operations and U.S. sponsored
assassinations.  This analysis leads to Chapter VI, which examines ways that
intelligence employees break the code of silence through whistleblowing and the
media.  The chapter explores the effects of whistleblowing laws on intelligence
employees, exemplified by the cases of two well-known CIA whistleblowers.  Finally,
Chapter VII concludes that comprehensive legislation should be enacted that
simultaneously protects the rights of whistleblowers in the intelligence community and
national security interests.  In particular, Chapter VII recommends that Congress
combine pending House and Senate bills to create a statute that adequately strengthens
whistleblower protections for all federal employees, including those in the intelligence
community.
5CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS AND MOTIVES FOR WHISTLEBLOWING
Whistleblowing scholars offer several definitions all with various motives and
outcomes.  This chapter will explore how different scholars view whistleblowing.
Each author offers a conclusion about the outcomes whistleblowers face after the act
of whistleblowing occurs.
Definitions of Whistleblowing
The act of whistleblowing is defined by social scientists and legal scholars in a
variety of ways.  Scholars offer different definitions of whistleblowing according to
how the individual reports the wrongdoing, the intent of reporting, and the results of
blowing the whistle.  According to Roberta Ann Johnson there are four key elements
in whistleblowing:  1) it is an act that intends to make information public; 2) the
information is conveyed to parties outside of the organization in order to make it
public; 3) the information deals with wrongdoing inside the organization and; 4) the
actor was or is a part of that organization.
1
  She further argues that whistleblowers act
as “policy entrepreneurs” when the information they seek to make public affects the
procedures and policies within an organization.
2
In contrast to Johnson’s arguments to view the whistleblower as a policy
entrepreneur, Terance D. Miethe argues that a whistleblower may be acting for various
reasons, not always with the greater good in mind.  Because, according to Miethe,
individuals often use whistleblowing to promote themselves or their career and are
exposed by their superiors for having done so, whistleblowers are portrayed as
“snitches,” “rats,” and “moles.”
3
  However, whistleblowers are viewed mostly as
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 Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing: When It Works and Why (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 3.
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 Ibid.
3
 Terance D. Miethe, Whistleblowing at Work (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 11.
6“saviors,” particularly by the public, despite the outcomes of their information sharing.
Beyond motive, whistleblowers are also labeled according to their methods:  internal
whistleblowers utilize organization offices and procedures to report their claims, while
external whistleblowers report their information to law enforcement, lawyers, media,
and various local, state, and federal agencies.  Above all else, an important definition
for whistleblowers, according to Miethe, is that they report the information to
someone who has the power to take corrective action.
4
Myron Peretz Glazer and Penina Migdal Glazer define whistleblowers as
“ethical resisters.”
5
  According to Glazer and Glazer, “Ethical resisters are employees
who publicly disclose unethical or illegal practices in the workplace.”
6
  Similar to the
arguments made by Glazer and Glazer, Stephen M. Kohn and Michael D. Kohn
emphasize the importance of whistleblowers to industry and government, but
particularly to the public.  Saving taxpayers’ money, exposing corruption, and
changing bureaucratic problems are all important results from the information
divulged from whistleblowers.
From yet another group of authors, Frederick Ellison, John Keenan, et al.,
whistleblowing receives a quite different definition.  They define whistleblowing as an
act or series of acts performed within an organization by an individual(s) who intend
to make information of wrongdoing public.
7
  In this definition, motives are not
considered relevant and the act must be intended to make the public aware.  Intentions
are purposeful, as the whistleblower wants the public to know about the wrongdoing,
while the motive may be different for the whistleblower, such as belief in ethical duty.
In contrast to Miethe’s definition, the fact that information is revealed to make the
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 Myron Peretz Glazer, Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 4.
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 Ibid.
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 Frederick Elliston, John Keenan, et al., Whistleblowing Research:  Methodological and Moral Issues
(New York: Praeger, 1985), 12.
7public aware makes whistleblowing a serious act against the employee’s organization,
as opposed to seeking an internal procedural change.  In other authors’ definitions, the
information may be brought to internal offices or superiors as an act to change the
organization from within, without the intent to make the public knowledgeable about
that information.  The consequences of public disclosure are deemed more serious by
Ellison, Keenan, et al., who contend that “reasons for going outside the organization
must be far weightier than the reasons for going quietly to a superior of one’s
immediate supervisor.”
8
  Furthermore, they argue that the information must be
recorded as “a matter of public record” through the newspaper, Congressional
Records, or the media.
9
  That is not to say that the information necessarily successfully
changes an organization; however, acknowledgment of the information by the public
is an important aspect of their definition.  The information revealed to the public must
be “about possible or actual, nontrivial wrongdoing in an organization.”
10
Reasons for Whistleblowing
But why do individuals decide to ‘blow the whistle’?  Every author tackles this
question differently, arguing that decisions are often influenced by professional and/or
personal forces.  Johnson argues that whistleblowing is encouraged at many levels of
government, by the public, and the media.  Changes in the bureaucracy to hire more
educated individuals and provide intensive training to new employees may also
contribute to the increased numbers of whistleblowers, according to Johnson.  She also
attributes this increase to the several state and federal laws that protect whistleblowers.
Finally, some institutions promote whistleblowing and support employees who report
wrongdoing and American culture values whistleblowing.
11
                                                 
8
 Elliston, Keenan, et al., 8.
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 Ibid.
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 Johnson, 4.
8Changes in the bureaucracy include the requirement of more educated and
trained individuals employed at all levels of government.  These highly trained
professionals “may feel that they have a distinct perspective on public problems and
solutions, one that may be nonnegotiable…some professionals may be less prone than
other officials to compromise when it comes to questionable decision-making or
wrongdoing.”
12
  Similarly, as organizations take on new initiatives and directives
professionals may seek to ‘blow the whistle’ when they question how their agency is
going to promote the public’s interest.  However, employees in the public sector are
less likely trigger protections due to several statutory exceptions within whistleblower
protection laws.  Therefore, agencies have instituted hotlines to allow employees to
discuss wrongdoing anonymously to protect the employee from reprisal.
13
  Congress
and the media support whistleblowers as well.  Congress utilizes whistleblowers as a
form of checks and balances on the other branches of government.  Johnson argues
that the ability for Congress to utilize information from whistleblowers “gives the
legislature entrée into what the agency does and can be harnessed to legislative
ends.”
14
  In contrast, the laws available to whistleblowers in the private sector promote
employees’ ethical duties and protect workers from retaliation from their employer,
according to Johnson.
15
Accountability, transparency of government, and the protection of individual
rights are qualities valued by Americans and when employees of large governmental
agencies come forward, the media is the most likely avenue for them to report
wrongdoing.  The media supports whistleblowers regardless of the stage of the
accusation.  Portraying whistleblowers as heroes protecting citizens’ interests against a
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 Johnson, 11.
15
 Ibid., 97.
9corrupt government are often the headlines of whistleblower stories even as early as
the accusation stage.  Other venues for whistleblowing include private organizations
and groups offering whistleblowing counseling and an outlet to discuss possible
repercussions prior to blowing the whistle.
16
  These groups also offer training seminars
about employee rights and may also offer legal services to whistleblowers who are
victims of reprisal.  Other nonprofit organizations support and encourage employee
ethics and government accountability, such as PEER (Public Employees for
Environmental Responsibility), GAP (Government Accountability Project), and
POGO (Project on Government Oversight).
17
Johnson however, warns against viewing whistleblowing as a heroic act, which
assumes that the employee has decided to put all personal gain aside in order to claim
illegal activities take place within his or her workplace.
18
  She argues that this
simplistic view of the whistleblower’s decision fails to recognize feelings of
desperation or disappointment and any activities that he/she may have done prior to
blowing the whistle to correct the situation.  In this regard, the process of deciding to
“blow the whistle” should be closely examined.  According to Johnson, the individual
is using a form of dissent against the employer for the good of the public or the
organization.
19
  The act of whistleblowing is often viewed as a breach of loyalty
between employee and employer; however, blowing the whistle is often the last resort
for an employee.  When the employee turns to whistleblowing as a last resort various
consequences will occur during each stage of speaking out, such as the accusation
being made public, the process of investigating the claim, and the actions that will
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10
follow if the claim is false or true.  But as stated earlier, Johnson describes the
whistleblower as a policy entrepreneur.  There may be policy changes during various
stages of whistleblowing, regardless of the outcome of the claim.  In this regard, the
whistleblower is a policy entrepreneur.  The employer may handle the case internally,
and the employee may be able to change internally without public knowledge.
Therefore, the whistleblower may affect policies in the organization regardless of the
claim’s viability or any reprisal he/she may experience.
For Miethe, the motives of whistleblowers may differ from ways in which the
media portrays them.  However, most important for Miethe is the act itself and the
ways in which whistleblowers are viewed by people around them.  Legendary
whistleblowers such as “Deep Throat,” who revealed President Richard Nixon’s
involvement in the Watergate scandal, and Frank Serpico, who spoke out about New
York City Policy Department fraud, may have made historical changes within their
organizations and the field itself; however, after their whistleblowing, colleagues did
not appreciate their disclosures and called them traitors.  As Miethe argues,
whistleblowers who speak out against colleagues and agency corruption may receive
labels such as “rat” or “snitch,” which alter whistleblowing’s social acceptability.
20
Miethe also argues that simply the threat of whistleblowing may be enough to
change an organization.  Organizations are often preoccupied with their public image.
The potential for whistleblowers to go outside the agency to expose wrongdoing can
ultimately curtail questionable practices.  Organizations may utilize other internal
processes to protect themselves against possible whistleblowing and eventual
exposure.  Regulatory audits and electronic surveillance assist organizations in
protecting the management and their employees from wrongdoing by monitoring
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11
financial and safety issues.  These activities have steadily increased across all sectors
in an effort to maintain a responsible organization.
21
In his book Whistleblowers at Work, Miethe observes the increase in federal
employees witnessing and reporting misconduct by utilizing three national surveys of
federal employees from the United States Merit System Protection Board (MSPB)
from 1981, 1984 and 1993.  The surveys show that during those years the proportion
of federal employees who said they witnessed wrongdoing decreased from half of all
federal workers to 1 out of every 5 workers.
22
  Miethe argues that these results may
have been caused by either less misconduct or more sophistication in the misconduct.
However, “the proportion of observers who are whistleblowers nearly doubled
between 1981 and 1992, and the rates of external whistleblowing more than doubled
over that time period.”
23
  This growth may stem from an increase in avenues for
reporting or workers’ greater awareness of their legal rights; yet two-thirds of federal
employees in the 1992 survey stated that they did not have the knowledge necessary to
report misconduct or how the laws work.
The personal costs of whistleblowing are also important for potential
whistleblowers to consider when contemplating exposing corruption, either internally
or externally.  Fear of reprisal was a primary factor leading to passage of most federal
whistleblowing statutes after the 1990s.  Reprisal comes in various forms, from
dismissal to demotion.  The threat of retaliation is also a form of reprisal. Verbal
abuse, threats toward family members, physical intimidation, loss of autonomy,
blacklisting, and financial loss may affect a whistleblower or a person threatening to
blow the whistle.  As Miethe reports, in the MSPB 1993 study of 1,500 federal
employees who observed and reported misconduct within the preceding twelve
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12
months, the proportion of employees exposed to various forms of retaliation include
the following:  23 percent, verbal harassment or intimidation; 22 percent, poor
performance appraisal; 20 percent, shunned by co-workers or managers; and 13
percent, denial of award. There were nine other categories with smaller proportions.
24
However, this may be just a small sample of the total retaliation that may be disguised
under other terms such as “reduction in force” or “changing needs of the agency.”
25
Factors such as race change the intensity of reprisal experienced by federal employees,
with African-Americans twice as likely to experience retaliation than their white
counterparts.
26
In their book, The Whistleblowers:  Exposing Corruption in Government and
Industry, Glazer and Glazer argue that whistleblowing has become increasingly
important and grew out of the public’s disillusionment over Vietnam and Watergate.
Overall, the country realized that high ranking government officials were using the
federal bureaucracy to “engage in unethical and illegal practices under a cloak of
secrecy.”
27
  Glazer and Glazer conclude that whistleblowing became a legitimate form
of social resistance against a corrupt government, locally and nationally.
Between 1964 and 1977, several accountability organizations and protection
boards were established to protect employees and their disclosures.  During this time
an important shift in federal government regulation took place, moving away from
industry specific regulations to general social regulations of all industries, illustrated
by the establishment of Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the
Environmental Protection Agency.  During the early 1970s, a few whistleblowers
made headlines and established the need and reliability of internal employees to
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13
expose wrongdoing.  Individuals such as Serpico and Daniel Ellsberg gave
whistleblowing its legitimacy in the eyes of the media and the public.  Serpico’s
exposure of New York City Police Department corruption led to formal investigation
and his testifying against widespread police officer payoffs amounting to millions of
dollars.
28
  After the investigation several police officers were convicted of accepting
payoffs.  In 1967, Ellsberg, who worked for the Rand Corporation, contributed to a top
secret report of U.S. decision making in Vietnam at the request of Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara; this report is known as the Pentagon Papers. The report
was over 7,000 pages long.  In 1969, Ellsberg took copies of the report to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and nineteen newspapers, which ultimately led to the
conviction of several White House aides.
29
  For Glazer and Glazer, these examples
illustrate the how whistleblowing became a widespread way for employees to bring
attention to agencies that misused public funds and deceived the public.
The Impact of Whistleblowing
Whistleblowers must reconcile the tension between their ethical duties to serve
the public and the possible costs to their personal and professional life.  Because of the
support received from the public, federal whistleblowers are, ironically, often the least
likely to be protected; the government hopes to keep whistleblowers silenced, as “no
administration will welcome within its ranks scores of whistleblowers who want to
reveal inadequate performance in federal agency.”
30
Kohn and Kohn discuss the legal rights of whistleblowers while highlighting
the various avenues lawyers can take to defend whistleblowers and their rights.
“Whistleblower cases are hard fought not just because of animosity which may arise in
the course of an employment discrimination case, but also because of the economic or
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14
political impact of the actual disclosures.”
31
  Their primary focus, in The Labor
Lawyer’s Guide to the Rights and Responsibilities of Employee Whistleblowers, is to
illustrate the problems found within the whistleblowing statutes.
There is no comprehensive federal law that prohibits
employers from retaliating against employees who disclose
potential corporate or governmental violations of law.
Instead, over the past fifty years there has been a steady
growth of specific statutory protections for employee
whistleblowers.  The statutory remedies cover a significant
cross section of the American workforce, but are riddled
with loopholes.
32
These loopholes can be found in the more than twenty-seven federal statutes
protecting whistleblowers, each with its own specific limitations, such as industry or
agency, filing provision, statutes of limitation, and protected activity.  It is these
loopholes that caused an increased awareness of the need for legal protections for
federal whistleblowers.
For Ellison, Keenan, et al., the success of the whistleblower can be measured
by four different outcomes.  First, a change in policy within the organization can
occur.  Second, compensation to victims can also measure the usefulness of the
information by serving as a deterrent or to reduce the overall harm done to individual
victims.  Third, the risks to the public are diminished if the information has led to
changes within the organization before public outcry or increased risks.  Finally, a
careful investigation by either internal inspectors or external reviewing agencies
assesses the situation that lead to changes or possible new evidence of wrongdoing.
These four outcomes assist the public in realizing the usefulness of information
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provided by whistleblowers and the necessity to protect these individuals’ personal
and professional lives.
33
Aside from defining whistleblowing and its effects, experts in the field of
whistleblowing policy differ in their opinions about the effectiveness of federal
statutes that attempt to protect employees, particularly for those involved in national
security and intelligence gathering.  Sarah Wood Borak offers a comprehensive
critique of the ineffectiveness of whistleblowing policies offered to federal employees
in her article, “The Legacy of ‘Deep Throat’:  The Disclosure Process of the
Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994 and the No FEAR Act of 2002.”
34
She argues that the overall benefits experienced by the public, the whistleblower, and
the agency often outweigh the personal consequences experienced by government
employees, particularly when the information is utilized to make necessary changes in
government accountability.  Legislation passed in the 1990s sought to protect federal
whistleblowers; however, the focus of the laws shifted from what the actual
information revealed to simply protecting the jobs of the employees.  Borak argues
that, as a result, the information is lost and changes in government agencies are not
made.  The bureaucratic processes to file whistleblower claims are cumbersome, and
documents are backlogged in government agencies designed to manage whistleblower
claims.  The loopholes in the statutes that fail to protect federal employees as
described by Kohn and Kohn are closely examined in Borak’s article.  She concludes
that these administrative problems reduce the effectiveness of the whistleblower’s
information.
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Whistleblowing is a unique form of protest for an employee.  Employees must
consider consequences to themselves and their families, as well as their relationships
with other employees and supervisors in the agency they work for.  A review of
whistleblowing literature reveals that scholars agree that blowing the whistle is
important to initiate changes in an organization.  Many argue, however, that
particularly for federal employees, initiating change proves to be difficult as the laws
in place to protect them are complex and ineffective.  As the legislative history will
show in the following chapter, whistleblowers in the federal intelligence community
are lost in a sea of laws and regulations that are supposed to protect them. 
17
CHAPTER III
WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Legislation offered by various Congressional members to protect federal
whistleblowers causes disagreements and struggles between the powers of the
executive and legislative branches.  The ability of the President to maintain control
over executive agencies and the need for Congress to hear from employees in those
agencies has resulted in varying degrees of protection for federal employees who blow
the whistle.  These struggles are most clearly illustrated during shifts in politics, such
as changes in the political climate of the country, the President in office at the time,
the public’s sentiment toward the federal government, and the importance of
employees’ rights at a particular time in whistleblowing history.  Private sector
employees enjoy protections under the some federal laws and are also protected by
state laws.  Federal employees, particularly those employed in intelligence gathering
agencies, are protected by only a few federal statutes.  This chapter will outline the
various laws that protect federal agency employees, tracing the enactment of the laws
from the early 1900s to the end of the 1990s.  The various shifts to strengthen or
weaken protections for federal employees will also be explored.  The history of
‘whistleblowing’ statutes protecting federal intelligence employees begins with the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA).
1
Before the CSRA
Prior to the CSRA, statutes included various clauses to protect employees from
dismissal for talking to Congress, but failed to specify what information was
protected.  The Lloyd-LaFollete Act of 1912 protected the rights of civil service
employees to individually or collectively petition Congress without interference.  The
Lloyd-LaFollete Act was added to an appropriations bill to prevent lawmakers from
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hearing only one side of a story from Cabinet officials, but not directly from federal
employees themselves.  Congress insisted on having access to federal employees’
complaints and observations about their agency and supervisors.
2
  After much debate
the interests of employees were included:  “The right of persons employed in the civil
service of the United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or
any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to any
committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.”
3
  This Act
rejected President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1902
4
 and President William H. Taft’s 1909
‘gag order’ to prohibit employees of executive departments from speaking to members
of Congress.
5
  According to Representative James Tilghman Lloyd (D-MO), the
Lloyd-LaFollete Act’s purpose was to prevent executive officials from being able to
“withhold information and suppress the truth or to conceal their official acts.”
6
However, it was not until the Watergate scandal that federal employees, as
whistleblowers, were the primary focus of legislation.
Need for Transparency
President Richard Nixon’s commitment to curtailing employment
discrimination was demonstrated in Executive Order 11478, signed on August 8,
1969, which gave federal employees protections similar to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
7
  In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act amended the
Civil Rights Act to include employees of government agencies at the federal, state,
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and local levels.  Under this amendment, public employees were given the same rights
as private sector employees against employment discrimination, including protection
against reprisal for having “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”
8
  This form of whistleblowing
was now protected for all federal employees.  However, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act and the Civil Rights Act were limited to discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, religion, and national origin, but did not protect employees more broadly
against retaliation for disclosures of mismanagement and waste.
9
While Nixon’s commitment to federal employees was illustrated by the
employment laws passed during his administration it was his illegal activities that
produced a whistleblower that would ultimately end his career.  The notorious
Watergate scandal and the extensive investigation by Washington Post reporters Bob
Woodard and Carl Bernstein into Nixon’s Committee for Re-Election Activities put
whistleblowing in the minds of millions of Americans and Congress.
10
  While the
Washington Post broke the story of the break-in into Democratic headquarters by
Nixon campaign staff members, the information of the involvement of high ranking
administration officials was given to reporters Woodard and Bernstein by an inside
anonymous source, “Deep Throat.”
11
  This information led to the subpoena of
presidential tape recordings and Nixon’s eventual resignation in 1974.
The source, “Deep Throat,” was later revealed to be a federal employee, and
specifically FBI former Assistant Director W. Mark Felt, leading to a five year debate
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over the separation of powers and the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act on 
October 26, 1978.
12
  Major provisions of the Act include requiring public disclosure of 
financial records by high-ranking civil service employees and public officials and 
prohibiting certain activities once their service had ended.
13
  
While not technically whistleblowing by the definitions of some scholars, 
Felt’s sharing of information to the public through the media, in order to expose 
wrongdoing at such high levels of government, makes “Deep Throat” the 
whistleblower of all whistleblowers.  Congress and the new incoming President 
realized that faith in the government needed to be restored in the minds of citizens 
after disillusionment over dependability and trustworthiness of the federal government 
following the Watergate trial and the printing of the Pentagon Papers.   
The CSRA 
 Newly-elected President Jimmy Carter hoped that Americans would regain 
trust in their government.  Carter wanted to ensure that the government was truthful to 
the American people.  He stated in his Inaugural Address, “I join in the hope that 
when my time as your President has ended, people might say this about our 
Nation…that we had ensured respect for the law and equal treatment under the law, 
for the weak and the powerful, for the rich and the poor; and--that we had enabled our 
people to be proud of their own Government once again.”
14
  In his first State of the 
Union Address, Carter unveiled his goal to restructure the government and reform 
civil service:  
But even the best organized Government will only be as 
effective as the people who carry out its policies. For this 
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reason, I consider civil service reform to be absolutely
vital. Worked out with the civil servants themselves, this
reorganization plan will restore the merit principle to a
system, which has grown into a bureaucratic maze. It will
provide greater management flexibility and better rewards
for better performance without compromising job
security.
15
With this promise the President sent Congress a legislative package consisting
of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the Reorganization Plan No. 2 that he
hoped would change the civil service employment sector forever.
 16
  The CSRA was
passed on October 13, 1978 and the Reorganization Plan was enacted by Executive
Order 12106 by President Carter on December 28, 1978.
The Reorganization Plan granted the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) jurisdiction in equal opportunity employment claims made by
federal employees.  Within each agency equal employment opportunity officers were
required by law to assist employees and abide by Title VII guidelines.  Under this
plan, Nixon’s inclusion of federal employees by Executive Order 11478 was also
detailed under the Reorganization Plan.
The Reorganization Plan also changed the landscape of agencies in the federal
government; it eliminated the Civil Service Commission.  The Plan created the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) to manage employee discrimination claims with
regard to administrative procedures and employees’ claims of wrongdoing within the
merit system.
17
  The MSPB’s responsibilities were to protect the merit system from
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political power and the rights of employees within the system.  The MSPB serves as a
“quasi-judicial agency in the Executive Branch that serves as the guardian of the
Federal merit system…MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and authorities
primarily by adjudicating individual employee appeals and by conducting merit
systems studies.”
18
  The new Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was to handle
the personnel management of the civil service of the federal government.  According
to a history provided by the Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) was also created within the Merit Systems Protection Board to
“investigate charges that might be brought against any Federal official of violating the
merit system rules and regulations, and to prosecute such matters before the Board.”
19
Congress was, however, more concerned with whistleblowing than with violations of
the merit system.
20
  These cases consist of claims made by federal employees
detecting fraud, mismanagement, or other wrongdoing within their agency and
brought to the attention of higher management, Congress, or the media.  Employees
who blow the whistle are often punished by the agency for insubordination.
21
  As
outlined in the CSRA, the OSC could prosecute agency managers who had taken
employment actions against the whistleblower, including reduction in pay, emotion,
discrimination, firing, or any other form of reprimand.
The CSRA was the first law to specifically protect whistleblowers against
reprisals and to establish procedures for claims brought by federal whistleblowers. The
Act included nine merit system principles and prohibited personnel practices, stating:
“Employees should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of
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23
information which the employees reasonably believe evidences (A) a violation of any
law, rule or regulation or (B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”
22
  This
statute allows employees to appeal directly to the MSPB for redress, regardless of
reasons provided by the agency for its actions against the employee.  However,
instances such as transfers or denials of promotion were to be brought before the OSC,
if the employee believed those actions were based on a prohibited practice.
23
  These
reasons included whistleblowing, discrimination, nepotism, obstruction of rights to
work and failing to take a personnel action if the taking of or failure to take such
action violated any law, rule or regulation regarding merit system principles.
Individuals who had experienced adverse personnel actions based on prohibited
reasons could seek assistance from both the MSPB and OSC.  Ultimately the MSPB
was the final investigator and decision maker on the claim of the prohibited personnel
practice and the OSC could not litigate in federal court on behalf of the employee
against decisions made by the MSPB.
The CSRA was an important symbolic step toward more effective government.
During Senate floor debate prior to the bill’s passage, Congress argued about the need
to protect to the most patriotic employees who sacrifice their personal lives for the
public’s interest.  Previous legislations charged the EEOC to coordinate trainings and
receive data from federal agencies with regard to employees’ claims, the OPM, OSC,
and MSPB were primary contacts for federal employees.
24
Definitional Problems of the CSRA
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The loopholes in the CSRA begin with the definitions included in the Act.
“Disclosures” are not defined and the law requires that claims initiated by an
employee be “substantial and specific.”
25
  The law also protected employers’ rights to
dismiss employees solely on the basis of lack of merit, which many employees were
unable to dispute.  Despite the new legislation and the new protections it offered, the
CSRA excluded from coverage all employees who served in the Central Intelligence
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and “any Executive
agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities.”
26
  As explained by the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs, the Act was not intended to protect employees
who disclose “information which is classified or prohibited by statute from
disclosure.”
27
Only the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had its own separate provision
in the CSRA.  Section 2303 provided protections through the Attorney General’s
office for employees who blew the whistle on the FBI.
28
  This provision was critical to
the overall history of the FBI’s engagement in wrongdoing.  Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-CO) stated that the protection of FBI agents was necessary to curtail the
“woeful history” of the FBI.
29
Inspector General Act
During this same period, President Carter signed into law the Inspector
General Act of 1978.
30
  Designed to be independent and nonpartisan offices, the
Office of the Inspector General of the twelve agencies under this law are to conduct
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audits and investigations of the procedures within the agency, support and advise the
agency with regard to efficiency and effectiveness, and keep Congress fully informed
about any deficiencies relating to the agency.
31
  Specifically excluded from the Act are
all intelligence agencies, the entire Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
32
  The Department of Justice was assigned a statutory IG in a 1988
amendment to the Inspector General Act.
33
  The CIA created an Office of the
Inspector General’s (IG) in 1952, but this Inspector General was not independent and
was selected by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).  President Carter said of
the Inspector General Act, “We are pleased to have worked with the Congress in
fashioning this legislation.  The reorganization of audit and investigation activities
complements other initiatives the administration has under way to fight fraud and
abuse in Government, including the strong whistleblower protection provisions in the
civil service reform bill….”
34
Problems with Both Laws
Despite the progress made by the Carter Administration to protect federal
employees from reprisal, the efficiency and effectiveness of the CSRA was heavily
disputed.  During the 1980s, federal employees complained that the OSC was not
investigating their claims in a timely manner.  Federal employees also complained that
the OSC revealed the identities of complainants to employers, which led to reprisal.
 35
The OSC’s primary mandate was to investigate claims of reprisal brought by
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employees of the protected agencies.  However, most cases were dismissed and only
one had been prosecuted from the signing of the CSRA in 1978 through 1989.
Analysis of results of a survey conducted by the MSPB in 1984 concluded that the
CSRA did not work and, in fact, the OSC closed 99 percent of reprisal cases
immediately upon their investigation.
36
  While good in its intentions, the CSRA was
ineffective in protecting federal employees from reprisal.
37
In 1986, Congress began working on legislation to correct and enhance
whistleblower protections.  Several changes to reprisal claim procedures were to be
included in the new legislation.  Proposed by Representative Schroeder in 1987,
House Resolution 25 attempted to give the OSC greater power to litigate claims and
reduce the burden of proof on the employee.  Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced a
similar bill, Senate Bill 508, which he hoped would increase the burden of proof on
the employer.  After hearings and debates, committees from both chambers concluded
that a major problem was that the OSC did not view its role as an employee protector
but rather as a protector of the merit system.
38
  They also concluded that employees
did not trust the OSC and viewed the MSPB as too restrictive.
39
  Finally, under the
combined bill known as the “Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1988,”
Congress agreed to change the procedures for whistleblower claims under the CSRA.
The WPA provided that the employee’s prima facie case must prove that retaliation
for reporting violations of the merit system principles was a “factor” as opposed to a
“significant” or “predominant factor” in a prohibited personnel action.  The agency
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would then have the burden to prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that the
action was not based on the whistleblowing activity.
40
  Despite the overwhelming
support of a unanimous vote by Congress, the WPA of 1988 was pocket vetoed by
President Ronald Reagan on October 26, 1988.
41
  He claimed that the Act would put
untruthful whistleblowers in a position to delay or manipulate the process and that
imposing a heavier burden of proof on the employer/agency unduly favored the
employees over the management.  Constitutionality was also an issue for Reagan.  He
claimed that if the OSC was given power to appeal an MSPB decision in a federal
court, two executive agencies would appear before a federal judge.
42
  This would
undermine executive power authorized to the President to resolve disputes between his
subordinates.  By the beginning of the following year, Congress was hard at work
reforming Senate Bill 508 for the new president, George H.W. Bush.
On April 10, 1989, S. 20, “The Whistleblowing Protection Act of 1989” (WPA
of 1989) was signed into law by President Bush.
43
  In his signing statement, Bush
stated, “Federal employee whistleblowers can make a valuable contribution to the
Administration's commitment to ensure effective and efficient use of tax dollars by the
Government.”
44
  Although somewhat similar to S. 508, the new law made
compromises on the objections to the previous bill, mainly that the OSC could not
litigate cases in federal court.  Under the new WPA of 1989, an employee has three
avenues to raise a claim.  The first is an employee appeal to the MSPB of an agency’s
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adverse action, known as a “Chapter 77.”  The second gives the OSC power to
institute an action directly with the agency; and finally, an employee could file a
grievance under the agency’s negotiated grievance procedures.  These employee
claims must identify a “personnel action” taken in response to a “protected disclosure”
made by a “covered employee.”  The prohibited personnel actions define conduct that
may not be taken against an employee who makes a disclosure he or she “reasonably
believes evidences – (i) a violations of any law, rule or regulations, or (ii) gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety, if such a disclosure is not specifically
prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically required by Executive
Order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the conduct of foreign
affairs.”
45
  The employee is protected when he or she discloses whistleblowing
information as outlined through this process.  Once again, however, the intelligence
agencies’ employees were excluded from the Act, similar to the CSRA.
46
Changes to the CIA Office of the Inspector General
Following the Iran-Contra Affair, various government committees performed
several investigations into the CIA’s files.
47
  Although the Office of the Inspector
General at the CIA issued a report on the scandal, it was not as exhaustive as the
findings made by Congress’ investigation.  Congress’ report concluded that the CIA
IG did not have adequate staffing or the resources to conduct these types of intra-
agency investigations.
48
  Therefore, it recommended that the CIA have an independent
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IG, as in other agencies where IGs were appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.  Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) was in favor of such a bill, sponsoring an
independent CIA IG amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Bill of 1989.
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Webster disagreed and offered to find
a way to make the IG stronger without giving the office full independence.  During
Congressional hearings on the bill, he offered initiatives to better train and hire IG’s
during the Congressional Hearings on the bill.
49
  The bill was temporarily sidelined
when the Senate offered a compromise; the DCI would file reports to the Senate
Standing Committee on Intelligence summarizing the activities of the IG.  The
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1989 contained a requirement that every six months
the DCI report to House and Senate Intelligence committees the activities of the IG.
50
This only made Specter work for a stronger CIA IG bill.
By late 1989, Specter introduced a revised version of his original bill
embedded in the Intelligence Authorization Act and began working to gain support
from the congressional intelligence committees.  DCI Webster and President Bush (a
former DCI) opposed the bill.  However, Bush changed his mind after the committees
and Webster agreed on a bill that would not hinder the passage of the entire
Intelligence Authorization Act, which contained the intelligence community budget.
On November 30, 1989, Bush signed the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990,
including the CIA IG provision.  The IG was statutorily independent, to an extent.
Although the DCI could keep the IG from initiating internal investigations in the
interest of national security, the IG continued to report to the DCI.  The IG’s role with
regard to whistleblowers contained familiar language from earlier whistleblower
protection legislation:
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(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from an employee of
the Agency concerning the existence of an activity
constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and
safety.  Once such complaint or information has been
received-
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation; and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee of the Agency in a position to take such actions,
unless the complaint was made or the information was
disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with
willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
51
This Act thus created statutory protection for employees to seek assistance from the
IG of the CIA without fear of reprisal.
Whistleblowing in the ‘90s
Despite the strides made by Congress to create procedures to protect federal
employee whistleblowing, complaints came from whistleblowers and their advocates
about the lack of progress made under the laws.  During this time, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) offered Congress insight into the failures of the WPA of
1989.  In 1993, the GAO issued a report stating that a major reason for the lack of
success experienced by whistleblowers was the lack of dissemination of information
about whistleblower protections in the agencies.  “The lack of agency commitment
appears to us to be a major problem in the whistleblower program.  If the program is
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to be successful, agencies’ support for the program is critical.”
52
  Effects of the WPA
of 1989 were also discussed at great length by members of Congress.
53
  The Senate
Committee on Government Affairs was concerned with OSC actions to protect
whistleblowers, while the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in the House
concluded that the 1989 Act had been counterproductive by creating “new reprisal
victims.”
54
  The House committee was also disappointed with the outcomes
whistleblowers received in federal court, stating that the “MSPB and the Federal
Circuit have lost credibility with the practicing bar for civil service cases.”
55
  Since the
creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982, employees prevailed on the
merits in only two cases alleging retaliation for whistleblowing.
56
  Aside from the lack
of progress in protecting whistleblowers who followed appropriate legal procedures,
overall employee satisfaction was poor with regard to the process and the offices
involved in handling their claims.  The GAO report entitled, “Reasons for
Whistleblower Complainants’ Dissatisfaction Need to be Explored,” addressed
employees’ views of the OSC and MSPB staffs’ effectiveness.  Approximately 81
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percent of federal employees who sought reprisal protection from the OSC gave the
office poor ratings for effectiveness.
57
By 1994, Congress once again stepped in to ensure that whistleblowers’ rights
were protected.  Amendments to the WPA of 1989 included a requirement that the
OSC provide a written status report to the whistleblower ten days prior to terminating
an investigation and allowing the employee to submit additional information.
58
  The
amendments gave prevailing parties the right to awards of attorney fees in some
cases.
59
  The changes also required the agencies’ administrators to inform their
employees of whistleblower protections and rights, and allowed the MSPB to order
corrective actions to place an individual in a position he/she would have been in had
the personnel practice not occurred, including the reimbursement of back pay and
benefits lost by the employee after dismissal.
60
  Again, Congress passed these
amendments unanimously and the Whistleblower Protection Act Amendments of 1994
were signed by President Bill Clinton on October 29, 1994.
61
  Proponents of
improving whistleblower legislation critiqued the amendments for their continued lack
of protection for intelligence employees, who were still excluded from the law.
62
Intelligence Community Whistleblowers
From the 1978 CSRA to the WPA of 1994, intelligence employees were
silenced by their exclusion from whistleblowing laws.  Their only remedies were
available from the Inspector Generals’ offices for such agencies as the CIA, DIA,
NSA, and others.  Separate from the rest, the FBI’s Office of Professional
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Responsibility was responsible for enforcing whistleblower protections in the same
manner as the CSRA.
63
  However, it took almost ten years for Congress and the
President to realize that, in fact, the FBI was not following those provisions.  President
Clinton directed the Attorney General to establish processes for whistleblower
complaints within the FBI after the extensive publicity about FBI crime-lab
whistleblower, Dr. Frederic Whitehurst.
64
  Dr. Whitehurst blew the whistle on the
flawed testimonies and inaccurate findings produced by various FBI crime-lab
employees.  Most significantly, his testimony in 1995 at the trial of the World Trade
Center bombing  called into question the scientific evidence collected by the FBI
during the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.
65
  Yet, despite the public’s continued
distrust of the FBI, the laws barred employees from seeking third party assistance,
such as non-governmental agencies, in whistleblower procedures.
Continued Problems
As the decade went on whistleblowers, particularly intelligence employees,
continued to reveal that they were facing reprisal.  According to an OSC report to
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Congress in 2000, the number of whistleblower reprisal claims in fiscal year 1998 was
691, with 654 of those cases closed by the OSC’s Complaints Examining Unit
(CEU).
66
  It was, however, a major whistleblowing story that sent the executive and
legislative branches into a frenzy over whistleblower protections and national security.
In 1995, a senior State Department adviser and White House aide, Richard Nuccio,
went to trusted friend, Congressman of New Jersey Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ), to
share information that he had held for two years about CIA operatives involved in
killing a U.S. citizen in Guatemala.  According to Nuccio, a Guatemalan colonel paid
by the CIA was involved in the killing of an American innkeeper and a captured
Guatemalan guerrilla who was married to an American lawyer.
67
  Concerned that the
CIA was covering up the information, Nuccio went to Torricelli, then a member of the
House intelligence committee.  Torricelli took the information to President Clinton
and the New York Times.  Then-DCI John M. Deutch dismissed both the chief of
covert operations for Latin America and a station chief in Guatemala, claiming that
they had failed to provide Congress and CIA headquarters with clear information
about the case.
68
  Despite this seemingly positive outcome, Deutch reprimanded
Nuccio for having gone to Congress without proper approvals.  Furthermore, Deutch
revoked Nuccio’s security clearance.  Nuccio resigned the following year after several
legal battles over his security clearance and his plea to Congress for greater reform
within the CIA and more whistleblower protections.
69
  Following the heated debates
that ensued, Deutch called for an outside panel to review the legality of these types of
whistleblowing disclosures made to Congress.
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In November 1996, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department
of Justice issued an opinion on the Nuccio matter’s implications for national
security.
70
  The eight-page document sought to clarify several issues including the
application of executive branch rules and practices on disclosure of classified
information to members of Congress and the applicability of whistleblower protection
statutes and Executive Order 12674 to employees with security clearances.  Executive
Order 12674 was included in the report because in 1989 President Bush established
the “Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees.”  The
generality of the order may offer an answer to the question the legality of the Nuccio
disclosures to Congress, because under the order employees are allowed to “disclose
waste, fraud, abuse and corruption to appropriate authorities.”
71
  The OLC opinion
concluded that Executive Order 12356, signed in 1982 by President Reagan, mandated
that classified information be handled solely in the executive branch.
72
  The OLC
concluded further that employees of intelligence agencies do not have the right to
disclose national security information to members of Congress because doing so takes
control out of the hands of the President.  It also argued that any disclosures made by
employees to Congress on a “need to know” basis, which are protected by the
Executive Orders and the Lloyd-LaFollete Act, are also limited by the requirement
that employees first utilize the decision-making channels within their agency prior to
taking information to Congress.  The OLC concluded, as well, that under the
whistleblower protection statutes, revoking of a Sensitive Compartmented Information
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(SCI) security clearance is not a “personnel action” and that whistleblower protection
laws only allowed disclosures of classified information brought to OSC or the IGs.
73
The release of this highly controversial OLC opinion prompted Congress to
hold hearings to determine if legislation was necessary to curtail the President’s power
over classified information and to protect employees who want to share information
with Congress of wrongdoing that may be deemed classified.  In two days of hearings,
on February 4 and February 11, 1998, Justice Department officials continued to argue
that congressional access to classified information held by intelligence community
employees without the approval of agency supervisors was unconstitutional.
Legislative solutions were promptly reported out of Congress following the hearings.
The resulting Senate bill would direct the President to inform employees of their right
to go to an appropriate committee of Congress to disclose evidence or reasons to
believe that there was “a violation of law, rule or regulation; a false statement to
Congress on an issue of material fact; or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of
funds, a flagrant abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.”
74
  In the House, Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter J. Goss
(later DCI) made comments in Congressional hearings about the lack of protective
measures for intelligence employees and the unacceptability of such a system.
75
  In its
final version, the Senate bill provided that the IG was the primary mechanism for
intelligence whistleblowers, but that it should not be the only process.
76
  Employees
could also bring information of wrongdoing before the intelligence committees as
another avenue to disclose information.  The Senate bill also prohibited the agency
from blocking the employee from going to Congress.
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After the Senate voted for the measure, S. 1668, 93-1, but prior to the House’s
vote on H.R. 3829, the Clinton Administration issued a Statement of Administration
Policy stating that S. 1668 was unconstitutional and would be vetoed.
77
  However, in
June 1998 after conference committee, the two houses reported the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 1999.  This included S. 1668 in full and was attached to the
budget of thirteen intelligence agencies.  A veto would impact the budgets of these
agencies.
The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1999 was signed into law by President
Clinton on October 20, 1998.  In his signing statement, President Clinton stated, “The
Constitution vests the President with authority to control disclosure of information
when necessary for the discharge of his constitutional responsibilities.  Nothing in this
Act purports to change this principle.”
78
  The Act allows intelligence community
employees to take a claim of wrongdoing to Congress and protects them from reprisal
or threats of reprisal for going to the appropriate members of the intelligence
committees.  Important key findings of the Act included:
 (1) national security is a shared responsibility requiring
joint efforts and mutual respect by Congress and the
President, (2) the principles of comity between the
branches of Government apply to the handling of national
security information; (3) Congress, as a co-equal branch of
Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as
a check on the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a
‘need to know’ of allegations of wrongdoing in the
Intelligence Community; (4) no basis in law exists for
requiring prior authorization of disclosures to the
intelligence committees of Congress by employees of the
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executive branch of classified information about
wrongdoing within the Intelligence Community; (5) the
risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of
the Intelligence Community for reporting serious or
flagrant problems to Congress may have impaired the flow
of information needed by the intelligence committees to
carry out oversight responsibilities; and (6) to encourage
such reporting, an additional procedure should be
established that provides a means for such employees and
contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the
classified information involved in such reporting.
79
The new law allows employees to report information to their IG or Congressional
Intelligence Committees and protects them from all personnel actions described under
the WPA of 1994.  For the CIA specifically, upon receiving a complaint, the IG has 14
days to determine its credibility and if so it must be sent to the DCI, who then has
seven days to report the matter to the intelligence committees.
80
  If the complaint does
not reach Congress within that time period, the employee may submit the complaint to
either the Senate or House intelligence committee directly.
81
  The Act also requires the
President to inform employees of their rights to disclose information.
82
  Attorney for
the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review at the DOJ, Thomas Newcomb,
summarized the effects this new legislation would have on the intelligence
community:  “For the most part, H.R. 3829 (the Act) simply averted a confrontation
between the branches; along the way, however, it has provided some assistance to
those within the Intelligence Community who recognize the need for informed
oversight from Congress.”
83
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A new era of whistleblowing protections was opened in the 1990s for
intelligence employees.  Duties of Inspector Generals and procedures outlining how to
bring information of wrongdoing to superiors and Congress offered federal employees
some protections from reprisal.  For employees of intelligence agencies, the laws
specifically excluded their agencies from whistleblower protections until the late
1990s.  At the same time, however, national security became increasingly important as
intelligence agency whistleblowers brought detailed information of mismanagement
and cover-ups to Congress and the media.  The future of whistleblowers within the
intelligence community would continue to take center stage as a series of new statutes
and events would prompt greater attention from Congress and American legal scholars
in the 2000s.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MILLENIUM AND WHISTLEBLOWING
Beginning in 2000, whistleblower advocates expressed the need for greater
federal agency accountability after whistleblowers came forward through the proper
channels and received no assistance with their claims.  Few whistleblowing allegations
submitted to the MSPB resulted in positive decision in favor of the whistleblower
during the 2000s.  This chapter of the thesis provides an overview of Congress’ and
whistleblower supporters’ attempts to establish more accountability in government
agencies, despite the political climate.
A Need for More Regulation
 Beginning in 2000, Congress once again investigated ways to offer better
legislative protections to federal employees.  In 2000, 245 cases were awaiting review
by the OSC, which went up to 380 the following year and reached an all time high of
555 by 2002.
1
  Many cases were delayed due to the lack of personnel at the OSC to
handle the caseload.  This problem, coupled with agencies lack of willingness to
inform employees about whistleblower protections, prompted Congress to explore
more avenues for agency accountability.
2
The need for accountability was clearly illustrated by the Coleman-Adebayo
case.  In August 2000, Dr. Marsha Coleman-Adebayo won a civil suit against the
Environmental Protection Agency for discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color
and a hostile working environment.
3
  In her capacity as the liaison to the Clinton
Administration’s South African Commission, she reported to EPA administrators that
South Africans were suffering from environmental hazards created by a U.S.-based
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company.  After her allegations were ignored by the EPA, she began to receive
negative feedback about her work.  She was denied several promotions and
subsequently, filed a lawsuit against the EPA.  She alleged that racial discrimination
was the reason she was denied promotions and that the EPA violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.4  She won her case in federal court, which awarded her $600,000
award in damages.5  The money to pay the award did not come from the EPA’s
budget, but from the Department of Treasury.  The Judgment Fund was established
through the Department of Treasury to fund settlements made by federal agencies.  In
reality, the agencies were not suffering financially in losing these cases.6  The
Coleman-Adebayo case, the increased backlog of cases, and the millions of dollars
spent by the Treasury’s Judgment Fund provoked Congressional hearings about
whistleblowing claims.  Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) introduced a bill
he hoped would hold agencies accountable for discrimination and retaliation by
making them financially responsible for damages.
Introduced on October 19, 2000 by Sensenbrenner, H.R. 5516 outlined
requirements to hold federal agencies accountable for violations of antidiscrimination
and whistleblower protection laws through monetary damages, publicity, and
Congressional oversight.7  The bill was introduced after Sensenbrenner, Chairman of
the Committee on Science, began receiving several complaints from federal
employees alleging discrimination and reprisal for speaking out against their agency
and superiors.  Congressional hearings on these issues began in March 2000, with
prepared statements from:  Blacks In Government, a non-profit government employee
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organization; the General Accounting Office;
8
 various Congressmen, including those
whose districts served large numbers of federal employees, such as Maryland and
Virginia; and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
9
  The 106th
Congress came to a close and Sensenbrenner’s H.R. 5516 was put on hold until early
in 2001.
Sensenbrennner reintroduced the bill on the first day of the 107th
Congressional session and H.R. 169 was sent to the Judiciary Congressional Hearings
on May 9, 2001.
10
  At the hearing, testimonies were received from Kweisi Mfume,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); J. Christopher Mihm, Director of
Strategic Issues for the GAO; Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., National President of the
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO; and Coleman-Adebayo.
Each of these witnesses reiterated the need for more agency accountability.  Many
witnesses also worried about the amount of money that the taxpayers were
contributing to defend the government.  Mfume stated, “It was shocking to me to
discover the amount of time, money and other resources that are expended defending
the federal government in these legal actions.”
11
  On October 2, 2001, the House of
Representatives agreed to final amendments and the bill was sent to the Senate.
12
  By
April of 2002, the Senate added a few small changes and the bill was ready for a vote.
The bill was passed by both chambers of Congress unanimously and required the
President’s signature.
13
The No FEAR Act and Greater Accountability
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The Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act
of 2002 was signed by President George W. Bush on May 15, 2002.
14
   Known as the
No FEAR Act, it applied to all federal executive agencies, including the Postal Service
and intelligence agencies, which had been excluded from previous whistleblowers
protection laws.  The reimbursement section requires agencies to repay the
Department of Treasury’s Judgment Fund when monetary damages are awarded to
plaintiffs.
15
  The notification section requires agencies to make the rights and
protections of federal employees available in writing to past, present, and future
employees of federal government, posted on the Internet, and through employee
trainings.
16
  Section 203 requires agencies to submit an annual report to several high-
ranking members of Congress and the EEOC.
17
  The report must include data on the
number of claims filed by employees alleging discrimination and retaliation, and it
must be submitted to Congress and the EEOC within 180 days after the end of the
fiscal year.  The Act also requires the GAO to conduct studies about aggrieved federal
employees.  Section 301 requires agencies to post employment data on their web sites,
including the total number of discrimination complaints, average length of time these
claims remain active, final decision on claims, and agency demographic data.  The
data set must include a 5-year history for each category.  Finally, the Act requires the
EEOC to collect and post all data sets from each agency on the EEOC web site.
18
Priorities for Whistleblowing Change
In the span of the two years it took Congress to succeed in finalizing the No
FEAR Act and having it signed into law, the United States experienced the worst
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terrorist attack in its history on September 11, 2001.  After the attack, several
whistleblowers came forward about botched investigations, poor security in airports,
and several other claims alleging that the federal government could have prevented the
attack.
19
  These disclosures prompted the formation of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9-11 Commission), “an
independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation and the
signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002.”
20
  Whistleblowers from various
intelligence agencies received little protection from reprisal under the law and the
enforcement of the No FEAR Act was sidelined while the federal government worked
on protecting the U.S. from further attacks.
21
Some civil rights activists applauded the No FEAR Act as groundbreaking
legislation and “the first civil rights law of the 21st century,” but others stated that the
Act did little to actually hold agencies accountable for discrimination and reprisal.
22
Because the national media brought attention to whistleblowers following September
11
th
, several bills were introduced in Congress to strengthen the WPA of 1994 with
protections for federal employees in the intelligence community.  After several years
of minor revisions, in 2003, Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced S. 1348 to
strengthen the WPA.  During Senate Hearings, Senator Peter Fitzgerald (D-IL)
expressed the delicate balance that must be maintained in any new provisions for
intelligence community whistleblowers:
…the easier it becomes to establish a prima facie case of
whistleblower retaliation, the more likely it becomes that
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Federal managers will hesitate to take steps to eliminate
unproductive or counterproductive appointees, impose
reasonable disciplinary measures, or insist on efficiencies
that some workers might challenge as retaliatory.
Therefore, in revisiting this important area of law, I look
forward to hearing specifically from the witnesses how
their views best promote this delicate balance between
encouraging good faith whistleblowing on the one hand,
and on the other, encouraging proactive and non-risk
adverse management of the Federal workforce.
23
Senate Bill 1348, known as the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act,
intended to add the revoking of security clearances to the existing prohibited personnel
practices provisions and to establish a confidential process for employees to seek
advice prior to reporting wrongdoing with national security information to Congress.
During the hearings, several individuals within the Executive Branch challenged the
Senate bill.  Peter Keisler, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division in the
Department of Justice, stated that the passage of the bill would undermine the
Administration’s ability to classify information.  If security clearances were added to
prohibit personnel practices, the MSPB and Federal Circuit may access the
determinations of security clearances and classified information brought forward by a
possible whistleblower during an investigation, Keisler stated: “We oppose these
provisions because we believe they would interfere with the Executive Branch’s
constitutional responsibility to control and protect information relating to national
security. And more specifically, the determination which individuals have a need to
know specific types of classified information.”
24
  The bill was put on hold while
Congress was out of session.
25
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During the same period, the deficiencies of the OSC were brought before
Congress.  In 2004, the GAO found that the OSC was backlogged and unable to meet
the growing demands of whistleblower claims.  The OSC “met the 15-day statutory
limit [to respond to the whistleblower] for whistleblower disclosure cases about 26
percent of the time.”
26
  At the same time, Scott Bloch, head of the OSC, was
surrounded by controversy after he ordered his staff to refrain from talking to the
public and removing “discrimination based on sexual orientation” from the OSC web
site and all OSC published materials.
27
  Bloch stated that the OSC was not responsible
for handling discrimination cases based on sexual orientation.  The White House
ultimately overruled Bloch’s statement.
28
In 2005, the OSC was again under scrutiny for not properly investigating
whistleblower claims.  A complaint was made anonymously by employees of OSC, as
well as their organizational supporters, POGO, GAP, and PEER, with a long list of
allegations of improper handling of cases by OSC.
29
  The claim alleged that the OSC
investigative division closed approximately 600 cases within a few months without
referring any for investigation in order to reduce the backlog of cases.
 30
  In response
to these claims and Bloch’s reorganization plan that resulted in several employees
leaving the OSC, Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) sent Bloch an inquiry about
the handling of these cases.  In a written statement, Waxman charged that “the Office
of Special Counsel is supposed to protect whistleblowers and taxpayers, yet it appears
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that hundreds of cases may have been dismissed arbitrarily.  We need to investigate
how these cases have been handled and whether the Office of Special Counsel is doing
its job.”
31
  Bloch contended that these cases had not met the standard of proof set forth
by the Federal Circuit.  This high standard of proof was a point of contention for
whistleblower advocates.  The standard of proof was set in 1999 in the Federal
Circuit’s Lachance v. White decision, which held that the employee had not met the
burden set forth by the WPA as amended.
32
  According to a POGO report:
The court decreed that the law only shields those charging
government misconduct when that charge is supported by
“irrefragable proof” (defined by the dictionary as
undeniable, uncontestable, incontrovertible or incapable of
being overthrown). This standard never appears in the
statute, reports by Congress on the language of the WPA,
or any decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board
involving whistleblower claims.  Amendments to the
statute approved by Congress in 1994 only require that the
“employee reasonably believe his or her disclosure
evidences” misconduct. Congress set this standard to
provide protections to whistleblowers who might be
“wrong” about their allegations, as well as those who were
right.  The unreasonable standard set by the court makes it
virtually impossible for a whistleblower to prevail unless
the wrongdoer confesses, in which case there is no need for
a whistleblower.
33
These issues brought the need for whistleblower protection to a head, and a bill to
strengthen the WPA of 1994 was reintroduced in 2005 and 2006 as S. 494, with
similar provisions offered in the Akaka bill.  The bill however, did not change the
language of the burden of proof on the employee, leaving the court’s decision in
LaChance v. White intact.
34
  Several lawyers, advocates, and DOJ officials took part in
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hearings and testimonies during the bill’s consideration.  Again, armed with criticism
and data about the OSC’s failures, Congress wanted to take action to protect
whistleblowers despite the Administration’s opposition.
35
  However, Congress was in
the midst of an election season and the bill was once again sidelined.
36
Bills on Hold
Finally, in 2007, the bill was reintroduced once again as S. 274 by Senator
Akaka and was passed unanimously by the Senate on December 17.  The bill
contained few changes from the first bill introduced in 2003.  During the same period,
the House was considering a bill introduced by Waxman entitled the “Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act.”
37
  Major elements the Senate bill are:  adds all agencies
that had been excluded from the WPA except the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency; allows employees to disclose information to authorized members of
Congress, or agency officials through any transmissions (information and formal
communications); adds the revoking or suspension of security clearances as a
prohibited personnel action; allows the MSPB or Federal Circuit Court to review the
clearance violation but cannot reinstate it; allows the OSC to appear as amicus curiae
on behalf of the employee; and adds a statement to nondisclosure agreements to
inform employees of their rights under the whistleblower protection laws.
38
  The
House bill includes:  adds all agencies that had been excluded from the WPA of 1994;
adds a section to outline the same protections for “National Security Whistleblowers;”
add the term “applicant” to the entire bill wherever the term “employee” is indicated;
adds scientists and government contractors under protections; protects disclosures
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made by employees during an investigation or as part of a refusal to violate the law;
explains “clear and convincing evidence”; and gives the MSPB 180 days to take action
on an employee’s claim after which the whistleblower can file suit in U.S. District
Court.
39
The House passed H.R. 985 on March 14, 2007.
40
  As of July 2008, the bill is
currently in the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
41
The Senate bill, S. 274, was passed on December 17, 2007 and is currently awaiting
reference to a House committee.  President George W. Bush threatened to veto both
bills.  He claims that the bills would increase the number of frivolous claims.
42
  Most
Republican members of Congress agree, contending that the bills raise security
concerns that may comprise the safety of the U.S.  Waxman, however, as chairman of
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, argues that open
government is necessary in light of several recent exposures of government
wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib and the Iraq War.
43
The millennium brought whistleblowers several bills designed to increase
protection against reprisal; however, bills were on hold in Congress due to national
events and executive power.  These bills would provide whistleblowers from all areas
of the federal government with better protections, especially for intelligence
employees.  The two pending bills, however, are not supported by all members of
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Congress or President Bush, and intelligence employees must wait until Congress’
offers changes to the bills or a change in administration.  Until then, intelligence
whistleblowers must rely on current law, such as the No FEAR Act.  The law did
made several changes to the process of blowing the whistle and requires greater
responsibility from government agencies.  The responsibility of reporting data and
information for the public is a way to increase government transparency.  Requiring
agencies to reimburse the Treasury is also a new attempt to hold agencies responsible
in employee relations cases.  However, despite the several attempts to strengthen
whistleblower protections following No FEAR, national security was an overarching
worry across the federal government.  In the intelligence community, examples of
employees who blow the whistle during a heightened period of fear of terrorism prove
that government accountability is of the utmost importance to the public.  For one
agency in particular, the CIA, whistleblowers contributed to the growth and honesty of
the organization authorized to gather information that may prevent national and
international tragedies.
51
CHAPTER V
A LEGACY OF SECRECY:  THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
As previously described, the national intelligence agencies were consistently
excluded from whistleblower protection laws.  More recently, however, the public has
begun to recognize the necessity to protect employees of the intelligence community
under federal whistleblowing laws.  This chapter will outline a brief history of the
CIA, one of the most secret government agencies of the Executive Branch.  As its
history will show, secrets were eventually revealed by CIA employees of the
government’s involvement in illegal activities such as mismanagement of federal
funds, and even coup d’états and murder.  The employees who revealed such
information often did so anonymously or after their employment with the agency
ended.
A National Clandestine Service
The CIA was created in 1947 by the National Security Act, which was signed
into law by Harry S. Truman.
1
  The agency was born out of the Office of Strategic
Services and later the Strategic Services Unit in the post-World War II era.  The
agency would be headed by a Director of Central Intelligence, who would be chosen
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  With the perceived threat of
communism and the possibility of a third world war with Russia, the armed services
generals devised a way for the United States to maintain a clandestine service.  Secret
hearings about the need for clandestine operations abroad were held by several
congressional committees during the early 1940s.
2
Several details about the organization were not included in the National
Security Act.  The Act did not specify where the money to fund clandestine operations
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would come from.  The Act gave the CIA broad powers to gather intelligence.
3
  The
vagueness of the Act offered the CIA and its director, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), the ability to conduct covert actions without Congressional
oversight.  The Act mandates that the CIA:
(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other
appropriate means, except that the Agency shall have no
police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions;
(2) provide overall direction for the collection of national
intelligence through human sources by elements of the
intelligence community authorized to undertake such
collection and, in coordination with other agencies of the
Government which are authorized to undertake such
collection, ensure that the most effective use is made of
resources and that the risks to the United States and those
involved in such collection are minimized;
(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence-related to the
national security and provide appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence;
(4) perform such additional services as are of common
concern to the elements of the intelligence community,
which services the Director of Central Intelligence
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;
and
 (5) perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the President
or the National Security Council may direct.
4
For much of the 1940s and 1950s funding was provided to the agency secretly from
funds appropriated to the Marshall Plan.
5
  CIA historians have found that the
agency’s culture and administrative reporting lines were riddled with problems.
Secrecy provided the CIA a way to maintain a positive image at home early in its
history.  However, several studies during the early part of the agency’s history
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concluded that the agency did not know nor understand how to run clandestine
operations abroad, gather intelligence and most costly to the government, run foreign
agents.
6
  Extensive research, including actual CIA documentation, provides
information about botched operations in Russia, Germany, and Korea.  Several CIA
employees left the agency after each debacle without a sense of purpose or
understanding of their missions.
7
CIA Failures
Allen Dulles, who was the Director of the CIA throughout most of its early
history, protected the agency at all costs.  Quickly shifting the blame for botched
investigations to individual CIA deputies and station chiefs, he led the CIA into
several missions that were not fully reported to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
later to President John F. Kennedy.  The largest secret mission undertaken in the late
1950s and 1960s was the plan to remove Fidel Castro from power in Cuba.
8
Eisenhower left office in the midst of the CIA’s plans to remove Castro, and he knew
that his presidency would be tainted by the failed operations of the CIA.  In his final
days Eisenhower lamented, “The structure of our intelligence agency is faulty.”
9
  In a
National Security Agency meeting on January 5, 1961 he said of managing the CIA,
“I have suffered an eight-year defeat on this” and he noted that he would leave “a
legacy of ashes” for the next president.
10
The failure of the agency to destabilize Cuba received criticism from all
corners of government, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, when
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CIA-trained Cubans failed to overthrow the Cuban government.
11
  It was not until
1998 that a 1962 report of an investigation led by the CIA’s own Inspector General,
Lyman Kirkpatrick, was declassified.  The report concluded that “Dulles and
[Richard] Bissell [Director of Plans] had failed to keep two presidents and two
administrations accurately and realistically informed about the operation.”
12
Congressional oversight of the CIA was not established until after the 1960s,
when a growing dissent against the war in Southeast Asia swept across the country.
By the 1970s, the need for oversight of the entire federal government came to the
forefront, particularly after the Watergate scandal.
13
  Former agents were also in the
media after becoming disillusioned with the agency in the late 1960s and bringing
their stories to the public.  In 1966, Victor Marchetti was a former assistant to DCI
Richard Helms.  He resigned in 1969 and published a book in 1971 entitled, The
Rope Dancer, which chronicles his experiences in the CIA.
14
  The media was also
involved in providing information about the need for oversight of intelligence
agencies, particularly after several articles written by New York Times reporter
Seymour H. Hersh exposed the CIA’s foreign activities supporting the overthrow of
foreign governments, the assassination of high ranking foreign officials, and illegal
domestic intelligence activities.
15
Hersh’s investigative reporting revealed information from documents
complied and classified by the agency.  In 1973, then-DCI James Schlesinger ordered
every employee of the CIA to report to his office any current and past activities
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“which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.”
16
Approximately 693 violations were included in the report; it was dubbed by t he
agency the “family jewels.”
17
  Hersh investigated for several months before he broke
the story of the CIA spying on U.S. citizens against the CIA charter; this was just one
of the many violations included in the “family jewels” report.
18
In 1974, these revelations led to the enactment of the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
19
  The amendment required the
President to report to Congress the descriptions and scope of CIA operations in a
“timely fashion.”
20
  It also sought to curtail excessive CIA spending by requiring the
President to submit a “Findings” report to Congressional oversight committees, the
Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees, before funding was appropriated to
the CIA for any operations.
21
  The Amendment constituted a significant shift in
Congressional policy, indicating that Congress would no longer allow the President to
conduct national security operations without their knowledge or to “acquiesce blindly
when the president affirmed a need for absolute secrecy.”
22
Congressional Oversight of the CIA
However, perhaps the most significant challenge to the CIA’s activities was
the establishment of two commissions, the Rockefeller Commission and the Church
Committee.  The President’s Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States,
or the Rockefeller Commission, was established by President Gerald Ford in 1974
and headed by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate the activities of the
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CIA.
23
   In 1975, the Commission submitted a report to President Ford with
information about CIA plots to assassinate Castro and Dominican Republic President
Rafael Trujillo, as well as details from several other investigations, such as the
assassination of President Kennedy and the CIA’s domestic surveillance of U.S.
citizens.  The report also described deficiencies within the CIA’s Office of the
Inspector General.  However, the report made few recommendations for amendments
to the CIA’s authority, for example, that the term “foreign” be added to the National
Security Act to ensure that the CIA’s scope only included foreign intelligence
activities.
24
  The commission findings and files were quickly utilized by the Church
Committee.
Later that year, in April of 1975, the Senate determined that an external
Congressional investigation into CIA activities was necessary.  The “Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities” was formed, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID).  The Church
Committee’s mandate was to “determine what secret governmental activities are
necessary and how they best can be conducted under the rule of law.”
25
  In its report,
the Church Committee recommended that the government of the United States should
not utilize assassination and that a federal statute should make it a crime to conspire
or participate in an assassination of a foreign official.
26
  Several findings included
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detailed information about assassination plots, the opening of U.S. citizens’ mail, and
domestic surveillance by the CIA.  Other unconstitutional activities conducted by the
FBI and NSA were also included.  Again, problems were found within the CIA IG’s
office.  The report concluded that the IG was not conducting full investigations due to
the CIA’s withholding of information.  Around the same time, former CIA agent
Philip Agee wrote a major book about the CIA’s dealings in Latin America.  Agee is
among the most well-known whistleblowers of the CIA for giving details about secret
missions and undercover agents attempting to overthrow Latin American
governments in the late 1960s.  The publication of his book, “Inside the Company:
CIA Diary,” led to the annulment of his passport in 1979 and the CIA’s view of him
as a traitor.
27
  However, Agee’s information, together with the committees’
investigations, led the Church Committee to recommend several statutory reforms
including separating the DCI from the activities of the CIA and greater oversight by
Congressional committees.  Yet, the Church Committee’s findings also maintained
that intelligence was necessary to the federal government’s abilities to implement
foreign policy.  Upon receiving the report in 1976, the Senate responded with several
initiatives.
Statutory Changes to the CIA
In 1976, the Senate passed a resolution to form an Intelligence Oversight
Committee.  Senate Resolution 400 was approved on May 19, with the intention that:
the newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would ensure that
intelligence agencies were receiving funds appropriated by Congress specifically for
that agency’s activities; reports were submitted by the directors of the agency with the
intention of making a non-classified version available to the public; and that directors
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keep the committee “informed with respect to intelligence activities, including
anticipated activities and those which constitute violations of constitutional rights or
other law.”
28
  A year later the House of Representatives formed a similar committee,
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
29
Congress also passed legislation aimed at government reform.  In the next two
years various statutes were enacted in response to the reports detailing the practices of
gathering intelligence and the federal bureaucracy’s inability to protect employees’
rights.
30
  The CSRA, Inspector General Act, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act are among the laws passed in the late 1970s.  By 1980, the Intelligence Oversight
Act aimed to curtail the intelligence agencies’ power even more.  The Act required
that the President report any activities of covert operations to the intelligence
committees and granted the intelligence committees the right to request intelligence
information.
31
  The following year, however, President Ronald Reagan attempted to
restore some secrecy power back to the intelligence agencies.  On December 4, 1981,
Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, which restored intelligence agencies’
authority to conduct activities “as the President may direct from time to time.”
32
  For
the CIA specifically, the order stated, the agency would “conduct special activities
approved by the President.”
33
  It would also conduct necessary intelligence activities
in the United States, to be coordinated by the FBI.  The sweeping powers Reagan
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gave the intelligence agencies and the CIA offered once again the veil of secrecy for
the agency to conduct activities that were otherwise illegal or unconstitutional under
its original charter.
Problems Ensue
During that same year, in 1980, the CIA won a significant case in the Supreme
Court after an ex-CIA agent wrote a book that had not been handed over to the
agency for review prior to publication.  The CIA requires all new employees to sign a
secrecy agreement.
34
  Under the agreement, the employee cannot publish or disclose
any information related to the agency without prior agency approval.  This was also
true for any former employees.  Frank Snepp’s book, Decent Interval, revealed
information about the CIA’s involvement in South Vietnam; however, the CIA did
not find any classified information in the book.
35
  The agency took Snepp to court
because he broke the contractual agreement he made with the agency prior to his
employment.  The Supreme Court affirmed and reversed in part the decision made by
the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.  It held that Snepp broke a
contractual agreement and thereby put the agency in danger.
36
  The Court also stated
that the violation did not depend on whether the book actually contained classified
information, because Snepp should have given the book to the CIA prior to its
publication to determine the information that could not be included.   The Court
granted the Government “relief in the form of a constructive trust over the profits
derived by Snepp from the sale of the book.”
37
  Justices Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall dissented, arguing that such relief was not authorized by law.  With the
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Snepp case and the Reagan Executive Order, the early 1980s reverted back to the era
of favoring the rights of the agency over rights of the individual.
In the late 1980s, after the Iran-Contra Affair, the public and Congress grew
increasingly suspicious of all CIA activities and intelligence reports.
38
  Several
miscalculations during Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and mixed results in the
Middle East left the CIA in disarray, even after several statutory attempts to fix it
internally.
39
  Congress and the presidents’ distrust grew during this period and the
CIA was kept largely out of foreign affairs.
40
  However, following September 11,
2001, Congress sought to change the agency and national intelligence as a unit.
The 9-11 Commission’s report included instances of lost information and the
CIA’s inability to convey important information to the appropriate people in the
administration.
41
  The report also stated that the overwhelming responsibilities of
coordinating CIA directives and general intelligence across all agencies left the DCI
with limited power.  The Commission recommended that the DCI position be split
into two separate positions, as the DCI could not coordinate all of the U.S.
intelligence agencies and run and manage the CIA.  The Commission wrote in its
final report:  “The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be
replaced by a National Intelligence Director with two main areas of responsibility:
(1) to oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the
U.S. government and (2) to manage the national intelligence program and oversee
agencies that contribute to it.”
42
  In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
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Prevention Act was signed into law by President Bush.  The Act created a Director of
National Intelligence as suggested by the Commission and changed the role of the
DCI to a Director of Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA).
43
Porter J. Goss, a former House Permanent Standing Intelligence Committee
member, was the last DCI and the first DCIA.  He brought in several aides, who were
considered highly political, to the CIA.  Ironically, Goss was one of the authors of the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1999 which allows intelligence employees to take
information of wrongdoing to select members of Congress.
44
  Yet he politicized his
brief term as DCIA by siding with the George W. Bush Administration’s distaste for
federal whistleblowers and more whistleblower protections.
45
  After the restructuring
the intelligence community reporting lines, several whistleblowers took their stories
to the media due to several demotions and revoking of security clearances of internal
whistleblowers.   In 2005, Goss stated, “Those who choose to bypass the law and go
straight to the press are not noble, honorable or patriotic, nor are they whistleblowers.
Instead they are committing a criminal act that potentially places Americans lives at
risk.”
46
Despite the Administration’s low tolerance for whistleblowers who talk to the
media, the experiences of CIA whistleblowers demonstrate to the public the need for
intelligence employees’ protection from reprisal.  In particular, the experiences of two
former CIA employees explored in Chapter VI, illustrate the lack of whistleblowing
protections in the intelligence community.  The involvement of the media in
whistleblower claims forces Congress to revisit whistleblower laws.  It was only after
September 11, 2001, however, that Congress’ patience for reprisal wore thin and
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stronger measures were introduced to better protect intelligence community
employees.
63
CHAPTER VI
WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE CIA
As outlined in Chapters II and III, the prescribed channels for whistleblowing
in the intelligence community create a complex system for employees to navigate.
The statutory procedures for blowing the whistle are complicated and difficult to
manage.  For CIA employees, specifically, the procedures may seem impossible to
embark on; therefore, the employee’s options are limited, such as providing
information to the media or publishing books after they retire or leave the agency.
Under current whistleblowing statutes, CIA employees have two statutorily defined
venues for reporting information - the CIA Inspector General or Congress.  Taking
information to Congress, as discussed in Chapter IV, requires the employee to refrain
from divulging classified information.  In effect, this leaves the actual avenues for CIA
whistleblowers as reporting information to the IG or the media.
Taking Claims to the IG
If a CIA employee observes any of the violations outlined in whistleblowing
statutes, the employee can take the claim to the CIA Inspector General.  Under current
law, the CIA IG is responsible for receiving and investigating “complaints or
information from an employee of the Agency concerning the existence of an activity
constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste
of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health
and safety.”
 1
  The IG must report this information to the Attorney General, but cannot
release the identity of the complainant without the employee’s prior consent.
2
  Within
14 days the IG should investigate the claim and determine if the information is
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credible; if so, that information must be submitted to the DCIA.
3
  When the DCIA
receives the report, it must be sent to the Congressional intelligence committees,
Senate Standing Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), within seven days, along with the director’s
comments.
4
  If the IG follows the appropriate timeline, he/she must notify the
employee of any actions taken on the complaint no later than three days after the
action is taken.  If the IG does not submit the report to the DCIA within the 14 day
period, the employee may send the complaint directly to the intelligence committees.
However, before doing this the employee must send the DCIA, through the IG, a
statement of the complaint and a notice of his/her intent to go to Congress directly.
The complainant must then follow the DCIA’s directions on how to go to Congress
using the “appropriate security practices.”
5
   It is unclear what happens if the DCIA
does not respond to the employee’s request to go to Congress.  The Act does not
address what happens to the complaint if the IG finds no truth to the complaint or if
the DCIA fails to submit the claim with comments to Congress in seven days.  The
law also is state what other options the whistleblower has under the law; it only notes
that an employee “may report such complaint or information to the Inspector
General.”
6
  It is difficult to establish whether or not an employee who ends up
submitting information to Congress may receive any sort of reinstatement or
protections for his/her job and salary.  Congress cannot reinstate an employee or
award back pay in the event retaliation took place.  Such details, which are so clearly
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articulated in the Whistleblower Protection Act and No FEAR Act, are not easily
understood for intelligence community employees.
7
Internal Conflicts at the CIA
While the CIA IG has duties set forth by whistleblower protection laws, the
CIA top officials recently made claims against the CIA’s IG office.  Directors and
mid-level managers questioned the IG’s investigative practices and asked for a formal
internal investigation by the DCIA into the IG’s office.
8
  Current CIA IG John
Helgerson had conducted an investigation after September 11, 2001 into the CIA’s
performance prior to 9-11 and thereafter.  In August 2007, Helgerson’s official
investigative report was released.  The IG report stated that up to 60 agents knew of
the threats posed by possible terrorists in the U.S.   He recommended that then-DCIA
George Tenent be held responsible, as well as those agents with information that could
have prevented the attacks.
9
  Quick to defend the agency and the position of the DCIA
was the current DCIA Michael V. Hayden.  Hayden stated that many CIA agents
criticized in the report argued that the IG’s investigation was mishandled.
10
  However,
the congressional intelligence committees and the 9-11 Commission praised the report
and Helgerson’s commitment to the IG’s office mission.
11
  After several complaints
about the IG’s practices, the time the investigations took, and the conclusions reached
by the IG’s report, DCIA Hayden instituted new measures to allow employees to
complain about the IG’s office.  The announcement of the creation of an
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ombudsman’s office in the CIA was sent to CIA employees in February 2008.
12
Hayden stated that the ombudsman would ensure fair internal agency investigations.
Also new to the IG’s office would be a quality control officer and new recording
equipment.  CIA officials said that Helgerson was in favor of all the new measures set
forth by the DCIA.
Ironically, in this case the IG turned into a whistleblower by doing his job.
The DCIA however, was quick to criticize the IG’s investigations despite the
overwhelming evidence in the 9-11 Commission report that supported the IG report’s
findings.  Despite the statutory independence of the IG office, the DCIA can quickly
control the results of any investigations that may tarnish the CIA, past or present,
because of his political affiliation with the President.  Intelligence committee members
disagreed with the investigation into the IG’s office, but as Senator Ron Wyden (D-
OR) stated to the Washington Post, “I’m all for the inspector general taking steps that
help C.I.A. employees understand his processes, but that can be done without an
approach that can threaten the inspector general’s independence.”
13
  Senate
intelligence committee Republicans feel the same way.  “The C.I.A. has a track record
of resisting accountability,” Christopher S. Bond (R-MO) committee’s vice chairman,
said in a statement to the New York Times.  Bond said IG Helgerson had been doing
“great work,” and added, “I will be watching carefully to make sure that nothing is
done to restrain or diminish that important office.”
14
  Debates about the independence
of the CIA IG continue both internally and in Congress.
15
The Last Resort:  The Media
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Given the strict reporting procedures currently facing all CIA employees, it is
more likely that an employee or former employee will go directly to the media.  As
discussed in Chapter V, for some whistleblowers, such as Agee and Marchetti, writing
books was the only option for public disclosure.  The media as an outlet for
whistleblowing, however, does not protect an employee’s job or reputation.  Luckily,
because reporters can often preserve the identity of their sources, the whistleblower
may avoid being accused for not coming forward.  The whistleblower, however, can
remain in his/her current job and continue to pursue career goals.  If the whistleblower
goes directly to a media source, such as Felt, it may be decades before the
whistleblower’s identity is revealed.
16
  However, based on whistleblowers’
experiences with the media demonstrate that they may be most concerned with the
importance of disclosing the information.  In a recent Vanity Fair article, Felt’s son,
Mark Felt Jr. described his father’s contradictory feelings about going to the media:
“Making the decision [to go to the press] would have been difficult, painful, and
excruciating, and outside the bounds of his life's work.  He would not have done it if
he didn't feel it was the only way to get around the corruption in the White House and
Justice Department. He was tortured inside, but never would show it.”
17
Two Whistleblowers’ Experiences
Regardless of how whistleblowers come forward, intelligence community
employees, and CIA employees specifically, have faced reprisals and loss of wages,
pensions, and reputation.  The experiences of Mary McCarthy and Richard Barlow
illustrate the costs to whistleblowers’ personal and professional lives, despite the
importance of the information they reveal.  McCarthy was fired from the CIA on April
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20, 2006, ten days before her retirement.
18
  Barlow was terminated in August 1989 for
“performance deficiencies” from the Department of Defense for information he
discovered and shared with Congress during his tenure at the CIA and DOD.
19
  Both
cases illustrate the varying degrees of difficulties current and former CIA employees
face when it comes to blowing the whistle.
McCarthy started her career in 1984 as an analyst in the CIA and then went on
to work for the Clinton Administration as a special assistant and senior director of
intelligence programs.  She worked for a few weeks in the Bush administration, but
returned to the CIA to work in the IG’s office.  While McCarthy continues to deny she
leaked any secret information to the media, several intelligence officials have
identified her as the agent fired for leaking information to the press.
20
In 2005, Washington Post investigative reporter Dana Priest published a series
of articles about the CIA’s secret prisons abroad and covert operations that involved
renditions.
21
  The reporting earned Priest a 2006 Pulitzer Prize for Beat Reporting.
22
Following the publications of these articles, then DCI Porter J. Goss learned of the
leaks coming from within the agency and called for a full internal investigation of CIA
employees with knowledge of such operations, subjecting them to polygraph tests.
23
CIA officials stated that an employee who had failed a polygraph had then confessed
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to leaking information to the Post.
24
  CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano told The New
York Times: “A C.I.A. officer has been fired for unauthorized contact with the media
and for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.  This is a violation of the
secrecy agreement that is the condition of employment with C.I.A.  The officer has
acknowledged the contact and the disclosures.”
25
  However because the Privacy Act
protected the employee’s identity, Gimigliano did not name the employee.  Media
outlets claimed that McCarthy was the fired employee after receiving tips from
internal CIA officials.
26
  Because the polygraph cannot be used as evidence in court
proceedings, McCarthy was not prosecuted and continued to receive her pension.
However, her lawyer continues to deny that McCarthy was the source in the Post’s
series of articles on secret prisons in 2005.  It is interesting to note that the articles
contain explicit references to “CIA officials” or “former CIA official” and yet, no
other CIA employees have been dismissed.  Debates continue over the discharge of
McCarthy.
27
  Some say that she was wrong to divulge classified information, which
was in clear violation of her agreement not to give that information to non-approved
outsiders without prior approval.  Others claim that the dismissal was justified but that
it was necessary to reveal information about the CIA’s secret “black site” prisons and
the detention of individuals without any recourse for a fair trial.  Given her tenure at
the CIA and her involvement in high security programs, the media was perhaps her
only alternative.  In an interview with MSNBC news analyst Keith Olbermann, Larry
Johnson, a former State Department Counterterrorism expert and CIA employee
stated: “…the last thing we need to have is our intelligence agency politicized.  And
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yet what’s going on here is, anyone that speaks out critical of the Bush White House,
when you have Paul Pillar, for example, who came out and said the White House was
wrong in trying to link Saddam Hussein to Osama bin Laden, what did the White
House do?  They put the word out through their operatives; they tried to smear Paul
Pillar. Mary McCarthy, I think, is the latest victim of this.  And they tried to make an
example of her.”
28
Many former intelligence community employees agree that the issues brought
forth by McCarthy should have been publicly disclosed.  Johnson continued on the
issue of the classified information in the Post:  “In fact, that [information] came from
multiple sources within the intelligence community who were alarmed that the United
States was starting to engage in the very practices we used to condemn the Soviets
for.”
29
  By using the media to disclose wrongdoing as a confidential source, McCarthy
was able to remain in her CIA position a year after her contacts with the Post.
Barlow began his career in 1985 as a CIA analyst of nuclear weapons in
developing countries.  In 1988 he received an Exceptional Accomplishment Award
from the CIA.
30
  During his tenure at the CIA, Barlow analyzed information about
Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.  He was surprised to learn that the CIA and the State
Department had been lying to Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities because
the CIA wanted to continue to support economic aid to recruit and train Pakistani
military to fight for the purpose of driving out the Soviet Union troops from
Afghanistan.
31
  According to the Pressler Amendment the President must certify each
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year that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons.
32
 Without this presidential
confirmation U.S. financial aid would not be given to Pakistan.  During the Reagan
Administration, the misrepresented confirmations were seen as little more than a
payoff to the Pakistani leadership for its support in defeating the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.  Barlow had discovered this information during his tenure at the CIA but
resigned in 1987 after CIA officials tried to remove him from working on nuclear
intelligence.
33
  He then joined the Department of Defense as a Foreign Affairs
Specialist in 1989.  He sent a report to then-Defense Secretary Richard Cheney about
Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons and the sale of nuclear technology to
other countries that the U.S. deemed as terrorist.  Barlow’s report included a statement
of violations of laws that keep the U.S. government from giving aid to countries who
support terrorism.
34
  Cheney dismissed the report and Barlow received a termination
notice in August 1989.
According to the GAO investigation in Barlow’s dismissal, “The investigative
files included a memorandum written by the supervisor that explained the basis for the
employee’s proposed termination.  In addition to discussing the performance
deficiencies, the memorandum indicated that the employee’s supervisor perceived that
the employee might make an unauthorized disclosure of national security information
to congressional staff.”
35
  Barlow’s security clearance was revoked and he was barred
from any work on nuclear intelligence.  He resigned his position and was temporarily
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reassigned to another position in the DOD.  Barlow formally resigned from DOD in
1992 after his security clearance was not reissued for his new position.
In 1993, Barlow’s information about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was
revealed to the nation by reporter Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker.  After this article
was published, Senators called for an investigation into Barlow’s claims of reprisal.
This investigation was carried out by the Inspector Generals of the State Department,
CIA and DOD, with the GAO sending the findings directly to Congress.  They
concluded that reprisal had, indeed, taken place.  Barlow filed a lawsuit against the
DOD for a wrongful dismissal and Congress supported his case.
36
  However, Congress
was unable to pass any amendments to provide Barlow with monetary relief.  At the
recommendation of Congress as an avenue to seek monetary damages, Barlow and his
lawyer, Paul C. Warnke a former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Carter
Administration, went to the Federal Claims Court.
37
  Once in court, the Executive
Branch used its State Secrets Privilege to keep important evidence from being heard.
As of February 2008, Barlow has yet to receive his pension or any back pay through
Congress or Federal Claims Court.
38
Barlow’s case is unique as a former CIA employee who did not actually blow
the whistle, but rather submitted a report to his superiors of information he discovered
as an analyst.  Yet his superiors used the “threat of whistleblowing” as a reason to
terminate his security clearance and force him out of his position.  Similar to opinions
offered by government employees after the McCarthy event, former intelligence
employees and politicians support Barlow’s decision to speak the truth.
39
  The
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information discovered and reported by Barlow was true and yet, those in the DOD at
the time escaped unscathed and are now in the highest positions within the current
administration.
These two cases offer a unique insight into the lives of employees in the
intelligence community who experienced reprisal due to their agency’s broad
definition of whistleblowing and fear of public disclosure.  The experiences of
McCarthy and Barlow also provide an insight into legislative reform needed to protect
whistleblowers more effectively.
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CHAPTER VII
THE FUTURE OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
While each whistleblower bill currently pending in Congress, H.R. 985 and S.
274, offers great improvements, a unified version of the bills would better protect
federal intelligence employees and close many of the loopholes in previous laws.
Currently, intelligence community employees have few options under the law to blow
the whistle.  These options do not protect the employee from reprisal in every case.
Intelligence employees therefore must speak to the media to remain anonymous and
protect their careers.  The media can also produce quick results for the whistleblowers,
by getting the information about wrongdoing out to the public.  Changes within the
bureaucracy or Congressional hearings can occur quickly when the newspapers or
television media bring forward information about unlawful activity in the federal
government.  For that reason, Congress should pass a bill that combines the best
aspects of the two pending bills, along with a few extra additions.  In doing so,
Congress would offer more adequate protections and coverage for intelligence
whistleblowers.
Protecting Whistleblowers and National Security
Intelligence community employees receive the narrowest whistleblowing
protections, as illustrated by the experiences of CIA employees.  While the number of
known whistleblowers from the CIA is limited to those who have made headlines,
those who are publicly known have faced great adversity.  Most of these individuals
were unable to remain CIA employees and all are viewed with mixed emotions by
members of Congress, other politicians, and their colleagues in the intelligence
community.  They are, however, supported by the public.
1
  The information they
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provided to the media, Congress, and their superiors bring the need for government
transparency to the forefront in American politics.   Scholars debate both the legality
of whistleblowers’ claims under current federal law and the motivations of
whistleblowers.
2
  Within the same analysis, scholars argue that the government fails to
capitalize on the information whistleblowers provide to bring necessary changes to the
federal government and executive branch transparency.  The government also fails to
provide the public with information about the changes agencies make when
whistleblowers come forward.  The knowledge of government wrongdoing makes the
public question the leadership of the country and process of disseminating information
about government activities.
The government’s assertion of interests in national security and state secrets as
a means to keep information from the public creates major obstacles for potential
intelligence whistleblowers.  As described in Chapter III, Congress has limited
capabilities to approve or disapprove the invocation of state secrets privilege, which
leaves the executive branch with the ability to keep information from the public.
National security or the invoking of state secret privileges offers the executive branch
and its agencies a virtually limitless means of restraining the dissemination of
information and of controlling the extent of information released to the public.  In the
national climate after September 11, 2001, the use of national security as a mechanism
to control the media and public opinion has greatly expanded, similar to that utilized
by various administrations during the Cold War.  Further, the government has been
able to use public fear as a mechanism to enhance the assertion of national security as
a basis to maintain secrecy.  This tactic, which is used to increase public insecurity
about the proliferation of terrorism or religious extremism, is similar to that used
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against communism.  Writing during the Cold War, national security scholar Arthur
Macy Cox states, “Fear, much of it whipped up by government national security
managers, has been the central reason for public acquiescence in giving priority to
security at the expense of freedom.”
3
  This method holds true in recent U.S. history as
well, and fear, combined with genuine concern of protecting national security
interests, increases the chances that intelligence whistleblowers will experience
reprisal and receive unfair trials on their reprisal claims before the MSPB or Federal
Circuit Court.  The heightened sense of the need to protect the nation at all costs
means that whistleblowers may be punished for compromising or jeopardizing
national security, especially if they are employed within those agencies charged with
finding out information about national security threats, such as the CIA.
Whistleblowers’ Options
The press is the only currently available option for national security or
intelligence community employees who seek to protect their identity and careers while
also blowing the whistle on unethical practices.  After Ellsberg’s release of the
Pentagon Papers to the press, two important cases were decided in the Supreme Court
about press access to and printing of classified information, New York Times Co. v.
United States and United States v. Washington Post Co., et. al.
4
  In these consolidated
cases, the freedom of the press was questioned when President Nixon attempted to
suspend the printing of the Pentagon Papers in the New York Times and Washington
Post.  The Court found in favor of the newspapers’ freedom of the press to print
information discovered during investigative reporting.  Justice Hugo Black, writing for
the majority, outlined these freedoms and rights:
                                                 
3
 Arthur Macy Cox, The Myths of National Security (Beacon:  Boston, 1975), 2.
4
 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, (1971); United States v. Washington Post Co.,
403 U.S. 943, (1971).
77
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role
in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not
the governors. The Government's power to censor the press
was abolished so that the press would remain forever free
to censure the Government. The press was protected so that
it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively
expose deception in government. And paramount among
the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any
part of the government from deceiving the people and
sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving
condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers
should be commended for serving the purpose that the
Founding Fathers saw so clearly.
5
While the press enjoys such rights, it also has the power to control and disseminate
information to the public.  Whistleblowers, who may seem powerful by holding onto
such information, are actually powerless and must be willing to continue working
silently, offer information anonymously, or offer information to the press as close to
their retirement as possible.  McCarthy, who had information about secret CIA prisons
abroad and disclosed the information to the Washington Post, chose to do the latter to
protect her reputation and finances.
6
While it is not clear that going to the press offers immediate results for the
whistleblower seeking to change his or her agency, the media does contribute to the
national debate about the importance of whistleblowing.  By highlighting
whistleblower stories and covering their struggles after blowing the whistle, the press
publicizes the need for better whistleblower protections.  It is beyond the scope of this
thesis to analyze the media’s involvement in policy-making, but it is worth noting the
media’s power to disseminate information which may lead to social and governmental
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change, and ultimately, government transparency and the limiting of governmental
power.  “…The debate over stopping government leakers is not about politics; it is
about government power.  Whistle-blowers and the media outlets they ultimately talk
to serve a vital role - one that was imagined by the founders of this country.  The press
was not meant only to be a megaphone for those in power - a means to keep people
informed of what they were doing - it was to be a monitor of power.”
7
The media’s function as an outlet for whistleblowers may suffice temporarily
while reforms for intelligence whistleblower protection laws continue in Congress.
However, as in the case of Barlow, who wrote in his report of the secrets within the
DOD, the possibility of blowing the whistle is relevant to all intelligence employees in
their everyday work-lives.  By simply doing his job, Barlow was considered a threat to
the agencies he worked for.
8
  He utilized the internal processes available to him by
speaking with his superiors and did not threaten to go to Congress with the
information he discovered.  Speaking or writing the truth within the scope of
intelligence agency employment, therefore, can be construed as whistleblowing by co-
workers or superiors, particularly if the information threatens the jobs of other
individuals in the agency.  It is difficult to make generalizations the extent to which
senior administration officials will lie to protect the interests of the President or the
agency; however in Barlow’s case it was apparent that then-Secretary of Defense
Richard Cheney and other senior officials at the DOD were willing to dismiss the truth
and invent information to protect the administration’s perceived interests.  Barlow’s
case may exemplify the public servant who sees his role within the government to
research and report his findings honestly.  Yet depending on the climate of the nation,
honesty may not always be the best policy.
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Intelligence Employees and their Rights
Whistleblowing laws pertaining to federal employees in the intelligence
community are riddled with loopholes.  The protections offered to these employees are
limited and the avenues for them to take after witnessing or discovering illegal
activities, gross mismanagement of funds, abuse of authority, or actions that may
affect the public’s health or safety are wrapped in bureaucratic procedures that
discourage employees from blowing the whistle.  Congress has wavered in its support
for whistleblowers in the intelligence community, with the exception of a few
politicians who have devoted themselves to protecting these employees.  Politics and
party affiliation also create barriers for whistleblowers, as evidenced by President
Reagan’s veto of stronger whistleblower protections.  Moreover the laws that are in
place for whistleblowers often do not protect them from reprisal.  It should not be
surprising that in 2005, the Congressional Research Service found that intelligence
community employees were more likely to go to Congress than utilize internal
reporting processes because whistleblowers were not adequately protected.
9
  Going
directly to Congress is, according to employees, the most efficient way to share
information, as the employees view their agencies’ preferred procedures as ineffective
and time consuming.  Given the overwhelming data on employees’ dissatisfaction
with whistleblower protections, it is clear that both legislative and cultural changes are
needed in the government.
The Future of Whistleblowing Protections:  Recommendation for a New Bill
As described in Chapter IV, two bills currently pending in Congress, H.R. 985
and S. 274, contain elements to strengthen whistleblower protections across all federal
agencies.  Each bill would amend and add new protections to the WPA as amended.
10
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Although each bill has merits, neither is adequate on its own to solve the problem of
weak protections in current laws under Title 5.  A better course for Congress to take
would be to enact a comprehensive bill that combines elements of H.R. 985 and S.
274, as well as a few additional amendments to provide adequate protections for
intelligence community whistleblowers.  The important elements from each pending
bill are outlined in Table 1.11  This table includes the portion of each bill that would
strengthen whistleblower protections for federal employees and, specifically,
intelligence employees.
Who Is Covered
A combined bill should extend protections to applicants, current employees,
and former employees of all agencies previously omitted from whistleblower
protection laws, such as the FBI, CIA and NSA.  Federally employed scientists, as
well as government contractors, should also be protected within the law.  This will
ensure that individuals, such as McCarthy, are able to enjoy their pension and
contribute to government transparency after leaving an agency.  The language used in
the House bill to protect national security employees is similar to the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1999, and therefore, it is not necessary to
separate “National Security Whistleblowers” within the new proposal.  It will be clear
that intelligence employees, current, former, and future whistleblowers, are protected
when going to their superiors, the OIG, and select members of Congress, as outlined in
previous legislation.  Amending this section of Title 5 to include employees of
previously omitted agencies, the current procedures for whom to share information
with will still be in effect.
                                                 
11
 For a discussion the legislative language and impact of each bill see:  Stephen M. Kohn, “S. 274 and
H.R. 985 Comparison and Recommendations,” National Whistleblower Center (24 April 2007).
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Table 1:  Comparison of Pending Whistleblowing Legislation
Senate Bill 274
Protects disclosures made during
formal or informal transmissions
Adds the suspension of revocation of
security clearances to a prohibited
personnel action
Allows MSPB or Court to issue
declaratory or appropriate relief if
security clearance revocation or
suspension is unjustified, but cannot
reinstate clearance
Allows OSC to appear as amicus curiae
on behalf of employee
House of Representatives 985
Protects disclosures made as part of an
agency or MSPB investigation or an
employee’s refusal to violate a Law
Protects "applicants" for federal
employment
Under "clear and convincing evidence"
the definition states "evidence
indicating that the matter to be proved
is highly probable or reasonably
certain"
Provides a new section to protect the
rights of national security
whistleblowers, in addition all rights
already protected by previous
legislation
Includes government contractors and
scientists as protected employees
Allows employees to take a judgment
to the Court of Appeals of the Federal
Circuit within 90 days following the
order
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Procedural Changes
As described in the Senate bill, any communications, documents, transmissions
via email, or written correspondence should be protected means to disclose
information that the employee or applicant reasonably believes violates the law.
12
These additions of allowing various transmissions for applicants or employees to
disclose information will encourage individuals to come forward and share
information with the appropriate people in any way they feel comfortable.  Also,
utilizing the House bill’s protection of disclosures made during an investigation and
the protection guidelines for employees or applicants who refuse to violate the law
will safeguard those participating in an internal investigation.
13
  Employees will be
more likely to speak up if they know that their disclosure will not lead to reprisal.
Yet another addition taken from the Senate bill is adding the suspension of
security clearance as prohibited personnel practices.
14
  The law could not provide the
remedy of reinstating or approving security clearances, as only the President or their
designee may do so.  The law could however, allow the MSPB to order an employee’s
job reinstatement and order back pay, which would to offer the employee some
remedy even if the agency cannot reinstate the employee’s security clearance.
Another change is that the nondisclosure form would contain a whistleblowing
provision to inform employees that in signing the form, they may not divulge
classified information of wrongdoing to anyone but Congress, the IG, and their
superiors.  While it is likely that agencies will continue to require employees to sign
secrecy statements with regard to the press and other non-governmental entities, this
change would allow employees to seek assistance from Congress or their employee
relations officers without fear of violating such contracts.
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 S. 274, Sec. I
13
 H.R. 985, Sec. 5.
14
 S. 274, Sec. 1.
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Another procedural change offered in H.R. 985 would alter the processing of
whistleblower claims.  Upon the review of the complaint, the IG or the agency head
will still have 180 days to determine if the complaint has merit and issue a corrective
action.  If no progress is made on the complaint within 180 days or an order denying
relief is issued, the employee may take the case to a Federal Circuit Court within the
90 days that follow the period after the order is given.
15
  During a Federal Court
proceeding, the federal government may still be able to invoke state privilege, but it
would have to submit to select member of Congress a detailed report of the case and
its reasons for invoking state privileges, and Congress may require the agency to work
with the employee to settle out of court:
In any case in which an Executive agency asserts the
privilege commonly referred to as the ‘state secrets
privilege’, whether or not an Inspector General has
conducted an investigation under subsection (b), the head
of that agency shall, at the same time it asserts the
privilege, issue a report to authorized Members of
Congress, accompanied by a classified annex if necessary,
describing the reasons for the assertion, explaining why the
court hearing the matter does not have the ability to
maintain the protection of classified information related to
the assertion, detailing the steps the agency has taken to
arrive at a mutually agreeable settlement with the
employee, former employee, or applicant for employment,
setting forth the date on which the classified information at
issue will be declassified, and providing all relevant
information about the underlying substantive matter. 16
Requiring such a report from the agency is a major addition to the previous
intelligence community whistleblower protection acts and this inclusion in a new bill
will add Congress as a third party to review the classified information in the claim.
The bill makes it clear that the invoking of state secrets “shall not be grounds for a
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 H.R. 985, Sec. 2303a(c)(2)(B)(3).
16
 H.R. 985, Sec. 2303a.
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dismissal of a case.”
17
  Therefore, an employee is guaranteed that those authorized
members of Congress will also view the claim on its merits.  The members of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, who already review various issues of national security, would be charged
with another duty in line with their existing function.
18
  Allowing Congress access to
such information would allow a true balance and equality among the branches of
government and require accountability at all levels of government.
Yet another procedural change is from the House bill.  Federal employees’
complaints may still be deemed insufficient by the IG or agency, and the employee
may seek action from the MSPB or Federal Circuit Court.  A new recourse is to allow
employees to take the final judgment of the appropriate United States district court to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
19
  This addition offers employees another
step to prove their claim.  While this is beneficial for employees, it will also calm the
worry that a new bill will give rise to frivolous claims, as few individuals would be
willing to spend the time and money to continue the case without sufficient evidence.
A new law, using a combination of new procedures and language from current
pending bills, will fully protect employees and the information they provide.  As
Thomas Devine, Executive Director of the Government Accountability Project, states,
“Genuine rights are long overdue for those who champion accountability within the
federal bureaucracy.”
20
  A newly amended Whistleblower Protection Act will protect
those who protect the country.
Next Steps
                                                 
17
 Ibid.
18
 David Everett Colton, “Speaking Truth to Power:  Intelligence Oversight in an Imperfect World,”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 137, no. 571 (1988), 584.
19
 H.R. 985, Sec. 9.
20
 Peter Katel, “Protecting Whistleblowers,” Congressional Quarterly Researcher 16 no. 12 (31 March
2006), 281.
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The disclosure process under current federal whistleblowing laws is
insufficient to achieve greater government transparency.  These laws do not
adequately protect intelligence community whistleblowers.  The government’s ability
to use national security as a guise for secrecy is a major hindrance to the effectiveness
of the laws.  Current laws also fail to utilize the information provided by
whistleblowers to hold agencies, officials, and politicians accountable for
mismanagement, fraud, and abuse.  The current option of blowing the whistle may
engage the employee in the legal system, albeit through flawed protections, but it does
not focus on the information provided by the employee or the need for greater
government transparency.  Thus, Congress should conduct further hearings to evaluate
what specific language could be added to the pending legislation that would enhance
the use of whistleblowers’ information while protecting their rights.
Within the intelligence community, a culture of honesty and transparency is far
from the norm in several agencies, and for whistleblowers in these agencies, the risk to
their personal and professional lives may keep them silent.  As in the case of the CIA,
information that was revealed several decades later could have changed the course of
U.S. history had whistleblower laws offered employees protection from reprisal.  New
protections for whistleblowers at all levels of government can save millions of federal
dollars, protect lives, and lead to a more efficient government.  New language and
procedures are needed and well overdue to accomplish these goals.  With such
changes, greater government transparency can be achieved and employees will be able
to do their jobs fully and honestly without fear of reprisal.
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History of the Church Report at “History Matters:”
www.history-
matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_church_reports_rockcomm.htm
History of the Iran-Contra Scandal:
www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/peopleevents/pande08.htm.
History of Richard Barlow at “History Commons” web site:
www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a81barlowstate&scale=3#a81barlowstate.
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History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html
Information about Federal Offices of the Inspector General:
www.ignet.gov/igs/homepage1.html
Information about the Pulitzer Prize:
www.pulitzer.org/citation/2006,Beat+Reporting.
Information about the pocket veto from the U.S. Senate web site:
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/pocket_veto.htm.
Library of Congress- THOMAS web site:
http://thomas.loc.gov/
The National Archive Service for information about the “family jewels:”
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO)
www.pogo.org
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER)
www.peer.org
Frank Serpico web site:
 www.frankserpico.com
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit web site:
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html
U. S. Office of Personnel Management web site:
http://www.opm.gov
U.S. Office of Personnel Management web site’s “Biography of an Ideal,” at
http://www.opm.gov/BiographyofAnIdeal/SubMain1977-1979.asp /.
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board web site:
http://www.mspb.gov
Whistleblower Protection Blog
www.whistleblowerblog.org
 “The Woodward and Bernstein Watergate Papers,” from
www.hrc.utexas.edu/exhibitions/web/woodstein.
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The 9-11 Commission web site and full report:
www.9-11comission.gov
